Ukraine and Russia: a political economic assessment of socio-legal relations in Eastern Europe
This research paper tries to examine the criminal case of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, which have both been ruled as crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC) – on its statute’s articles 6, 7, 8 and 9 (International Criminal Court, 2021) – and the United Nations (UN) International Court of Justice (UN News, 2022; iTV, 2022). This case demonstrates an example of a weak global socio-legal network, whereby Ukraine has been promised much for leaving behind its Russian connections but has been given very little support when it came to war (Sauer, 2016; Pavliuk, 2002). Our global society is struggling between standing up for democracy and violating international laws. This makes it an instance of the weak artificial international peace between two poles, which humanity has developed at the end of the Cold War. Russia has withdrawn its signature from accepting the rules of the ICC in 2016 and is therefore now not a land where any ruling of the ICC can be enforced. This means that even if Russian officials are found guilty, they will never be arrested unless on a land that accepts the rulings of the ICC (Neal, 2022; Deutsch & Sterling, 2022). To understand how we have got here, we need to ask:
What is the socio-legal context of Russian-Ukrainian relations? How can we perceive situation through a political economic understanding? These are the questions I will aim to answer through the history of Ukrainian-Russia relations and power-games in the international political economy.
Explanation of the development
Ukraine (Ukraina, meaning ‘borderland’ between the East and West, originally the Russian, the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires) has a long history with Russia (Sasse, 2001, p. 69). Ukraine has been one of the largest areas linked to Russia within the USSR. Ukraine became independent in 1991 and has been struggling between orienting its relations towards the European Union (EU) – which other post-soviet countries have joined – and its energy-supplier, Russia. Despite Ukrainian leaders’ effort to join Western alliances, such as the EU or the NATO, Western leaders have never signed Ukraine’s application, in order to avoid conflicts with Russia over violating the post-Cold War power-balance (BBC News, 2022). Russia, the ‘Eastern pole’ of global politics, feels threatened by the potential loss of independent regions between the two blocks. Ukraine joining the NATO – the ‘Western pole’ – would mean Russia would be surrounded by US arms on all sides (Mearscheimer, 1993). In other words, the independence of Ukraine from both the East and the West is a matter of where the border between the two poles lies and how close these borders are to one another. Consequently, the often times ‘proactive aggressive’ labelled actions of Putin are din fact efensive and reactive (Lane, 2017; Mearscheimer, 2017). Although, after the invasion of the Crimea in 2014, Russia has withdrawn from the ICC, without consequences (Neal, 2022; Deutsch & Sterling, 2022). From a socio-legal perspective, this development is an extreme fragmentation of international law: the established international organisation (IO) lost its power over Russia the minute it withdrew its voluntary membership, and now the global society is struggling to defend its sociologically democratic values in Ukraine, without harming international legal doctrines. Yet, it might as well be a matter of defining clear borders between the poles.
Identification of the relevant political/economic context
Based on Sokov (2015), the neoliberal understanding of the 2014/2022 Ukraininan-Russian conflict can be understood from the context of securing one’s political economic position. On one hand, a Ukrainian nuclear weapon would deter the Russian threat and thereby promote international security, because it would stabilise nuclear powers in the region. Yet, on the other hand, until recently, Ukraine did not see a big enough threat to need nuclear responses, and sook to join alliance (NATO) to promote security instead. The threat of retaining nuclear weapons was a tool to extract material concessions for a nuclear renunciation decision, as well as for obtaining security guarantees from the US vis-á-vis Russia. Ukraine is highly dependent on international trade, its two main trading partners are Russia and the EU (accounting for 60% of foreign trade) and both favour adherence to the non-proliferation norm, therefore nuclear deterrence was preferable for peace. Yet, with president Zelenskyy, the non-proliferation discourse of Ukraine has changed, angering Russia. Zelenskyy has tried to get closer to EU- and NATO memberships, as well as developing a stronger army and declared intentions to develop nuclear weapons for its safety. With the shift in discourse, we need a new understanding of the perception of Russia as a threat, big enough to raise arms and develop links to the oppositional alliance of the West. Yet, on the other side, Russia is one of the two poles in the international power-arena, seeking to keep its position, and therefore, the status quo (Lane, 2017; Mearscheimer, 2017). In other words, the political economic context around the situation in Ukraine is an intersection of a global power-play between the two poles (with the West inviting Ukraine to join its ‘pole’ while Russia demanding its status quo neutrality) and an independent country trying to navigate towards the West, against the will of Russia – and the post-Cold War world-order ‘agreement’ (Ritchie, 2019).
Political economic explanation
Political economy is a useful lens for analysing the socio-legal issue of Ukrainian-Russian relations. Within Ukraine, as Yurchenko (2012) assessed, the post-Soviet Western, neoliberal reforms – in line with the EU, World Trade Organisation (WTO) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) – in the Ukrainian market have led to so-called ‘black holes’ in the economy: by allowing for capital fight and different taxations, whereas the ‘productive base continues to be subjected to a process of accumulation by dispossession, deepening socio-economic disparities and furthering transnationalization of the state.’ (p. 125) With a pluralist democratic discursive and legal cloud around, this situation constantly undermines the post-Soviet stabilisation of the country’s neutral position both, internally and externally, in the global arena. The socio-legal situation is a navigation between the two poles. As Özsu (2015) has also argued, there is more to the self-determination of Ukraine than a pure legal understanding. On the sociological side, we must not miss the power-play of rival classes – with different visions of the world’s order –, which formulate ‘lofty’ and ‘cynical’ forms of self-determination. ‘This compels us to confront the class dimensions of the concept of collective self-determination rather than continuing to conceive it as a purely national, or ethno-national, project of recognition or emancipation.’ (p. 434) Therefore, Ukraine is a complex combination of socio-legal struggles and political-economic ‘black holes’. Ukraine has been navigating between the two poles since its independence, both sociologically (equal divide between pro-Russian and pro-West regions) and economically (about equal amount of trade with Russia and the West). Yet, this balance has started to be turning towards the West (Rywkin, 2014).
Zooming out, the global political economy has historically determined the neutral position of Ukraine, after its ‘independence’ from the Soviet Union and Russia. The West has promised 1) NATO- and 2) EU memberships for a long period of time (Ritchie, 2019). Hence, the Ukrainian citizens and leadership had high hopes in turning away from Russia. The West, instead of bridging the gap between the NATO and Russia, keeps the NATO alive as an opposing pole. This is a silent continuum of the world wars and the Cold War, which meets in the Ukrainian conflict – on the borderland of the two poles – where one pole is inviting the ‘neutral’ borderland to join, harming the balance (Sauer, 2016). Yet, when it came to action, the West failed to effectively support Ukraine’s Western partnerships or to intervene both, in 2014 and in 2022 (Pavliuk, 2002; Bretton-Gordon, 2022; Tenzer, 2022). Ukraine is still awaiting its NATO and EU memberships, while it has made its position clear on breaking up the status quo, which statement is now costing thousands of human lives (Aljazeera, 2022). Is the West scared of another Cold War by formally breaking up the informal post-Cold War agreement among the two poles and their balance?
Reflection
Reflecting on the above-mentioned socio-legal context and political economic understanding, what is then, the socio-legal context of Russian-Ukrainian relations? Ukraine’s case is complex both, sociologically and legally. The country has historic ties with the Eastern pole of Russia, but recently, the independent nation’s laws are aiming to get closer to the Western pole of the NATO, as well as the EU. Meanwhile, the Russian society is not ready to let go of its status quo power-position and the West is not ready to formally strengthen itself against Russia, by taking Ukraine in – after establishing the post-Cold War era of peaceful balance among the two poles. Based on Cornell’s (2016) assessment, sociologically, the understanding of the West that the Eastern power player, Russia, truly has interests in cooperation and bridging the gap between the two poles, will keep leading to unsuccessful laws. Consequently, the conflict over Ukraine cannot be resolved by the current attitude of the West.
Second, how can we perceive the socio-legal conflicting situation through a political economic understanding? The global political economy has created and given an artificially neutral position for Ukraine: staying away from nuclear arms, from Russian ties, but also from the West (Ritchie, 2019). This given position has turned the country into an economy of ‘black holes’ (Yurkencho, 2012), and led to Putin’s reactive actions, when the independent country has shown interest in accepting the invitations of the Western pole, breaking up the status quo of power-balances (Lane, 2017; Mearscheimer, 2017). Therefore, the 2014 and 2022 conflicts in Ukraine originate from the global political economy’s will of power-balance among the two poles, resulting in the ‘armed punishment’ of an independent democratic country’s will to get closer to one over the other. International laws and agreements conflict with sociological needs (that of Ukraine to join the West and that of Russia to keep its position), within a two-pole political economy.
References
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