The Un-Uniqueness of Constructivism: A Rational Analysis of Barnett and Finnemore’s Concept of IOs

  International Relations

The Un-Uniqueness of Constructivism

 

A Rational Analysis of Barnett and Finnemore’s Concept of IOs

 

 I. Introduction

International Organisations (IOs) have become a phenomenon that is emerging since the end of the World Wars and even more since the end of the Cold War (Martin and Simmons, 2013).

Barnett and Finnemore’s constructivist account of IOs argues that they are autonomous actors, wielding various forms of power and sometimes acting in ‘dysfunctional’ (or pathological) ways (1999).

In the study of International Relations, where no universal truth has replaced the constant debate yet, it is important to see their context of IOs’ autonomy, power, and pathology from another, oppositional perspective (which allows us to be critical and draw our own conclusions and understandings), here, rationalism. This essay will discuss both, points on which rationalists would agree with Barnett and Finnemore and where they would offer a different explanation. It will critique Barnett and Finnemore on the grounds of the autonomy and – closely linked – power of IOs. Yet, rationalists would agree with their study on the potential irrationality of rationality in the pathology of IOs (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999).

This critical comparison is important because IOs are core actors in International Relations where most cooperation happen. If we truly understand how they work – which scholars only debate about today –, we might be able to form future IOs to be ‘perfect’ (Keohane, 1988: 393).

 

 

II. Barnett and Finnemore’ IOs (1999)

 

First, it is important to briefly look at Barnett and Finnemore’s constructivist understanding of IOs in order to then be able to spot its strengths and weaknesses through rationalism. 

Constructivism, in general, argues that structure ‘makes’ the identity of agents by shaping their interactions, and structure is, in turn, influenced by interaction. It approaches the world as a social construction where (1) world politics is underpinned by social facts, (2) states act in a social context, and (3) identities and interests are social and can change (Yoxon, 2018b). In the international arena – according to constructivism – we find anarchy, and it is ‘what states make of it’ (Wendt in Yoxon, 2018b).

Barnett and Finnemore’s writing on IOs applies this approach to offer a new perspective of the power and relevance of IOs, analysing them as autonomous entities. For them, the autonomy of IOs is important, as they believe that economists’ perception how IOs are only ‘machineries’ extending state-actors’ interests is problematic (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 704). They argue IOs are indeed capable of altering their construction of ‘…opportunities and constraints facing states through their control over information…’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 704).

Second, for them, the power of IOs is dependent on their rational-legal legitimacy and their ownership on information and expertise, which connects back to IOs’ autonomy (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707). Here, they are not alone in claiming the influential power of IOs’ existence (Kelley, 2009).

Finally, the pathology of IOs through their lens has five sources: the irrationality of rationalisation, bureaucratic universalism, normalisation of deviance, insulation and cultural contestation (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707-710).

 

 

III. Rationalism

 

After realism has failed to forecast the end of the Cold War and became unable to explain the formation of state-cooperation in IOs after the World Wars (such as the United Nations or the European Union), rationalism has emerged arguing that reality and theory are essentially the same and reason is behind both, what exists and what we think – unlike its predecessor arguing these matters’ independence (Martin and Simmons, 2013; Huenemann: 2008: 1; Bochenski, 1963). This approach is often argued to be a via media on the realist-internationalist axis (Yurdusev, 2006: 319). Similar to realism, – instead of an ontological search for ‘what reality is’, – rationalism also epistemologically enquires ‘what/how we can know reality/knowledge’ (Jackson in Yoxon, 2018a). ‘Rationalist theories derived from economics, for instance, offer the following heuristic: if you have a puzzle, formulate it as a problem for rational actors with.’ (Katzenstein et al., 1998) 

 

Rationalistic studies on IOs are focusing narrowly and separately on specific institutions and what each has as a benefit to offer for its members. Without that, there would be no IO – due to the rational-choice theory, that assumes states rationally calculate the benefits of their actions, such as joining an IO (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 705).

In this view, IOs also have an impact on the ‘patterns of costs’ Keohane, 1988: 386). Yet, rationalists see sovereign states as the core actors, therefore, IOs cannot be independent from them (Keohane, 1988: 386-387).

 

 

IV. Discussion: Rationalists Versus Barnett and Finnemore’s Constructivism on IOs 

 

Once we are aware of constructivism and rationalism, we can now critically assess Barnett and Finnemore’s concept of IOs through the latter.

First, there is a storng disagreements on the autonomy of IOs. While rationalists look at IOs as ‘agents’ of sovereign states, Barnett and Finnemore’s constructivist approach analyses them as independent identities (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999). Although, both sides have their well-established reasoning, it is an ‘egg or chicken first’ debate as both arguments seem true, when looking at IOs. Harald, for example, uncovered that the US government indeed affects IOs (2017). This is because IOs are solely constituted of state actors (for example, the UN), therefore, we may never know if an action belongs to the institutions as a whole (of all actors involved) or it is the reflection of state-action (Abidin, 2016).

Second, Barnett and Finnemore disagree with the rational-choice theory on the power of IOs. They argue states sign up without calculated benefits, because those interests are constantly changing, depending on the global context, norms and other opposing members’ power. In their sense, instead of mere ‘tools’ of state-interest IOs, for them, are powerful (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 705-706; Kelley, 2009). 

Yet, Barnett and Finnemore acknowledge that the authority of IOs is, in fact, rational in the sense that the bureaucracies embody the rational knowledge in rule-making, where those ‘rules’ created assert how to achieve certain goals (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 707).  Although, Barnett and Finnemore turns back to autonomy by claiming that is sponsored by this ‘embodiment of technical rationality’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 709). 

In addition, – in the context of the pathology of IOs – they admit Weber’s (a leader of rational theory) perception on the extreme of rationality that can turn into irrationality (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 720).

 

Although, it is still important to keep in mind that the weakness of both sides remains the same: we cannot confidently draw powerful conclusions from today’ existing research (Martin and Simmons, 2013). In addition, again, we remain unable to judge the superiority of either side due to the state-member structure of IOs. So far, particularly in International Governmental Organisations (IGOs), there has been no truly sovereign actor above the state-level – which fact might eventually allow some more power for rationalists above constructivism (Abidin, 2016). 

 

 

V. Conclusions

 

Although, rationalism and Weber have often been criticised, yet, as we have discovered, they still have a lot to offer when it comes to the critique of IOs, in particular, those through Barnett and Finnemore’s lens.

Rationalist arguments differ from that of Barnett and Finnemore on the autonomy and the power of IOs. These two points are interrelated on the grounds of IOs’ independence. Whereas Barnett and Finnemore argue their independence, rationalism discusses their role as states’ ‘agents’. On this note, and only on this point, rationalism gains a limited advantage above constructivism as IOs (particularly IGOs) today, are not sovereign above their members who are indeed dominantly state-actors (Abidin, 2016).

Yet, the sides come to a common understanding in the pathology of IOs, in particular, that their rational nature is able to turn into irrationality (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999: 720).

Although, both theories remain weak: they both contribute to the arena of existing research that does not allow us to draw conclusions (Martin and Simmons, 2013). Therefore, there is much space for future research on overcoming this lack of all approaches of IR, including that of constructivism and rationalism.

 

 

 

 

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