Poststructuralism: not yet a theory

Political Enquiry in International Relations

Should poststructuralism be considered a theoretical paradigm in IR?

Abstract

This question has multiple answers, but those who argue poststructuralism is a theoretical paradigm to International Relations, forget that poststructuralism does not come over the limits of other perspectives ‘because there is no alternative ground upon which it might be established’ (Ashley cited in Hoffman, 1991: 177) apart from language. Poststructuralism is – until this day – unable to serve us as a theory because it has to use the same language and discourse-based ground, and this phenomenon can be seen in how poststructuralists often build on Foucault and genealogy.  Poststructuralist scholars mainly use genealogy as their tool of analysis, which is itself a historical account verified by discourses on history (Vucetic, 2011). They also usually take Foucault as an example in favour of poststructuralism, when he was originally a structuralist and does not theorise at all, only deconstructs with various limitations: using genealogy and limiting where all text should operate to the  ground of struggle for power (Keeley, 1990; Merlingen, 2013; Vucetic, 2011). By doing so, they not only fail because they must use the same language- and discourse-based ground they critique, but they even choose a discourse based historical approach for their analysis: genealogy. This method fails to contribute to poststructuralist values because poststructuralists encourage us to be suspicious on regimes of truths and their truth claims, yet they operate within the same regimes of truths. Also, in principle they deny stability, yet in practice using genealogy they must use stabilisation in order to be able to enquire about some inter-subjective system of meanings (Vucetic, 2011).

This essay will explore these failures, why poststructuralism is unable to serve as a theoretical paradigm in International Relations, by finishing on some academic critique of poststructuralism, when we will have the necessary knowledge of these failures in order to understand those critiques.

Even though some scholars argue yes, poststructuralism is a theoretical paradigm because it questions other theories and finds what they miss, what they are unable to answer, just like all other theories do, trying to be a supplement or an alternative answer – neorealism often questions realism (Jackson, 2016), neoliberalism has doubts on neorealism (Nye, 1988), Marxist scholars critique neoliberalism (Cox, 1981), and so on. However, this essay will argue the opposite: poststructuralism cannot be considered as a theory of International Relations as it is deconstructive without offering anything in the place of its critique of other theories (Miller, 1990), and therefore it is unable to be a theoretical paradigm, as a theory would always provide ‘something else to believe in’ in the place of what has been critiqued and it is even enforced to make the ‘same mistakes’ in its analysis it critiques. The reason behind this lack is that there is no ground yet for poststructuralism to be established in as a theory, as it has questioned the root of all other theories: language and discourses, and as for now we do not have a language- or discourse-free World, where poststructuralism could serve as a theory (Ashley cited in Hoffman, 1991: 177-179).

To demonstrate this complex issue, I will first introduce key poststructuralist findings, how they will be understood through this essay. Then I will explore how poststructuralists are ‘ahead of their time’, in the sense that they have been stucked in the world of language and discourse, and therefore limited to use the same method of communication they assess, and by this enforced to step into the same mistakes they critique in the first place. I will do so by analysing first, how poststructuralist scholars make the same mistake of relying on socially constructed truth via their historical account: genealogy, especially Foucault, who is often took as a basis for poststructuralists (Keeley, 1990). Second, consequent from this, how poststructuralist critique is formed within the same regime of truth and can also make those casual claims it critiques, because it is unable to operate in a world outside language and discourse (Vucetic, 2011). Third, based on this knowledge we will explore the criticism on poststructuralism as by then we will be able to understand by knowing the forces behind, what pushes poststructuralism to make those ‘mistakes’ it critiques.

First of all, poststructuralism’s main deconstructive argument is that we should always be suspicious on everything, such as metanarratives and truth claims, as everything is based on discourses and power relations, relying on language, and therefore there is no reality apart from language and what is said by that. By doing so it is a good approach for critique and saving us from taking otherwise ‘taken-for-granted truths’ created by the discourses of those in power (within certain relationships as power is always a relation) to shape knowledge, as power is a discursive ability to determine ‘normal’ through terms of speech (Miller, 1990). Consequently, it is a good tool to take marginalised cases into account by using a bottom up approach (looking at local politics to reflect on World politics, not the other way around) as it does not allow dominant theories to dominate, also this way we can avoid generalisation and include minority issues as well. As poststructuralist scholars mainly rely on the use of genealogy (a historical account) they provide a strong historical analysis, but at the same time, this is the point where my argument becomes relevant the most: the use of genealogy pushes poststructuralist into making casual claims what we will discover this later (Vucetic, 2011). As for now, it is important to see that poststructuralism has no non-discursive language to use (what would be correspondent according to Foucault), therefore it must use the same language and discourses it critiques, and as it is unable to serve as a theory without the necessary ground, it can only critique. Unfortunately, no human can live in such uncertainty, we always need ‘something to believe in’, and poststructuralism only provides questions, not answers (Merlingen, 2013) and do this openly, identifying itself negatively, never as being ‘something’ else, never as an answer (Young, 1982).

Secondly, as we can see poststructuralist scholars – I argue – are not only in power to shape our knowledge by their studies (due to their academic status what we usually connect to a higher knowledge compared to ours), but even they can only express their thoughts and encourage us to be suspicious about everything through language and discourse. Even though they critique this ground of language and discourse, yet they keep using genealogies for their analysis, which ‘are historical accounts justified by historical evidence which must be validated in some way’ (Vucetic, 2011: 1306). In other words, they not only use the language- and discourse-based ground, but they even choose a discourse-based method for analysis, namely genealogy.

To discover this problem, let us first look at Foucault and his concepts, who I’ve chosen because many poststructuralist scholars take him as an example or ground for their analysis, even though he is sometimes argued to still be a structuralist as we are unable to go beyond the structure of language, therefore there is no ‘post’ version of structuralism yet (Young, 1982). ‘Foucault does not theorise […]; he produces jarring interpretations that uncover and promote struggles. Therefore we cannot deduce hypotheses from his work’ (Keeley, 1990: 96), we can only apply his devices to explore possibilities, which I find a perfect proof of how poststructuralism cannot be a theory, what cannot exist without the action of theorising, it can only be a critical tool. Another problem with Foucault is not only that he denies one scientific truth but accepts another (Vucetic, 2011: 1299) – what itself goes against the poststructuralist conviction about suspicion (explained above) –, but also the fact that he himself limits where all text should operate: within the struggle for power (Merlingen, 2013). This, for me is just as much a discursive limit as any other assessed by poststructuralism, because (even though Foucault’s power/knowledge bears out that all knowledge is formed by discourse what is formed by power, that is a network of relations) by setting up such a rule via discourse itself, to operate within we reject other possible grounds within what we could operate our research. Therefore, we are not suspicious enough for poststructuralist values if we do not question this compulsory field of struggle for power.

Now consequently we must look at genealogy, the method used by Foucault and later poststructuralist scholars, in order to deeper understand the limitations of poststructuralism within the ‘soil’ of language and discourse. As I have mentioned before, genealogy also makes the casual claims what poststructuralists deny ‘in theory’, but every criteria is formulated within a regime of truth it critiques (Vucetic, 2011: 1307-1308). In other words, poststructuralism encourages us to be suspicious on truth claims (created by regimes of truth), yet they operate within the same regime of truths as there is nothing outside of it to use or critique. As poststructuralism can only use language as for now and ‘the use of language necessarily involves validity claims, and ‘unless the claim of ‘truth’ could be validated, [… ] human speech would be meaningless’ (Habermas cited in Brown, 1994: 220), therefore there would be nothing to theorise nor to critique without words. In addition, genealogy denies stabilisation in principle, yet in practice it must use it in order to enquire about some inter-subjective system of meanings, as for this one has to assume the stability of other inter-subjective systems (Vucetic, 2011: 1308-1309). This is also an aspect which demonstrates that poststructuralism to be a theory – if keeps using genealogy – would require a non-discursive field to operate in, because it cannot express itself without relying on the stability of all the other inter-subjective systems outside of what is critiqued, as there would be no point in studying one from all if they can be the same without stable difference between them.

Last but not least, as now we have discovered the underlying limits of poststructuralism – limits of Foucault, who is taken as a ‘template’ for poststructuralists, and also the tool, genealogy used by him and other poststructuralists – we can now move on to analyse critiques on poststructuralism, knowing these ‘forces’ in the background. Poststructuralism is deconstructive, but some argue this is simply a new word used for analysis. If we take this argument seriously, we can agree by looking at that poststructuralism not only fails to answer continuity, solidity, or uniformity (which are also important and obviously occurring processes in International Relations through history), but also only opens up questions and even defines itself negatively, never willing to give answers (Merlingen, 2013). I argue that for something to be called as a theory must provide ‘something else to believe in’ and by this, I mean answers for the questions it opens up. Poststructuralism then clearly fails this criterion. Therefore, as I have argued poststructuralism is unable to serve as a theory not only because it does not theorise only critiques, but because it uses Foucault’s arguments and genealogy for analysis which limits them to fall into the same ‘mistakes’ of casual claims and operating within regimes of truth, what they critiqued in the first place. This is because there is no non-discursive language yet and ‘[…] literary criticism can no longer be theoretical as such’ (Young, 1982: 9).

In a conclusion then, as I have demonstrated above, we can see poststructuralism – even though is a strong critique – as for now is unable to serve as a theory. It is ‘ahead of its time’ and because of that, there is no yet a language- or discourse-free ground it could be established in and by this it is enforced to make the same mistakes it critiques by the use of genealogy. This can be seen not only from Foucault’s work on genealogy on one hand but also, consequently by using genealogy. Poststructuralist criteria and claims are formed within the same regime of truth it has critiqued, and therefore the tool in use, genealogy can also make the same casual claims, poststructuralism has been critiquing in other theories. We can see, even if we would ignore the fact that poststructuralism does not theorise and does not offer anything in the place of what has been critiqued, only encourages us to always be suspicious (which is a non-theory-like warning signal already), it falls into the same mistakes it critiques. So, it would be unable to fight back the criticism from other theories, it is unable to differ as it wants to, because there is no language- and discourse-free ground for it yet.

Once that ground is created, it can function as a theory because it will be able to communicate ideas and conclusions via a method away from language and discourse. Something that can broadcast feelings, pictures as well as entire situations (putting a rich person into the position of the poor for instance) would be the most effective, as by this we could minimise the failure of communication as one can feel different about the same situation due to their background and experiences, therefore we should use a method what can simulate the entire picture to the listener the best, leaving out the least of it. Yet as for now, it is not possible to communicate without our discourses, language, words, just like I could not have transmitted my thoughts to the readers of this analysis without words, therefore as for now, we cannot consider poststructuralism a theoretical paradigm in any means including in International Relations.

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