Reasons behind Fidesz-support

Political Participation and Democracy

Far-Right Electoral Behaviour in Post-Socialist Hungary

A study of the reasons behind the increasing far-right support in Hungary

Abstract

The existing literature on why Hungary – a post-Soviet state shows a tendency in electoral behaviour to vote far-right and allow Fidesz to gain a 2/3 majority in the parliament for the third time in a row – although sees some relationship between contemporary party preferences and the experience of the Soviet system before the 1989 transition, it wrongly focuses on separated, single factors that can shape this phenomenon in electoral behaviour. Instead, we must bring them together to see the whole picture, as voters are also much more complex and who build their party-preferences on multiple grounds. It is not about one level but about all the different backgrounds. Therefore, this essay will analyse the systemic- and the socio-economic effects as well as the development of democratic politics since 1989. This will allow us to see the complexity of Hungarian electoral behaviour and will show us the importance of bringing socio-economic factors into the analysis when we are examining Hungarian party-preferences. Hungary has an overwhelming majority of those who have experienced the communist era, therefore their preferences shape Hungarian politics. We must never forget this when we look at collective tendencies and other data.

 

Introduction

There is clear and well-discovered evidence on the relationship between the experience of the far-left Soviet Union its communism and contemporary electoral behaviour (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000). Yet, we still do not fully understand why in Hungary there is a radical rise of the far-right Fidesz-government, winning an absolute majority for the third time in a row in the 2018 elections (Országinfó, 2012). Even though, the field is somewhat discovered, the recent radicalisation of the Fidesz government in Hungary – a possible herald of what is to come in the post-Soviet world – is not yet fully explained by the existing literature. We do know about the static tendency to vote far-right, mentioned before, but we do not know ‘how’ it is the case or ‘why’ it is the case. Therefore, this essay will discover how the experience of the Soviet communism has an impact on electoral behaviour of Fidesz voters. It aims to support the scholarship on that post-socialist states – where communism has been a far-left system – show a tendency to vote for far-right (Umland, 2017). I will uncover the underlying impacts of the experience of the Soviet Union on electoral behaviour by analysing the evolution of post-communist democracy, the socio-economic relations and differences, as well as the changes of politics and electoral behaviour in Hungary. This study will examine Hungary particularly as a result of the unique rise of the far-right, which did not (yet) happened so radically in other post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe. Contemporary political events urge us to be able to understand the causation in order to allow us to react or in other cases, to prevent the emergence of the far-right, which has led to the disastrous events of World War II (Benner and Reinicke, 2017). To see the general reason why Hungary, a post-Soviet Eastern European state’s electoral behaviour shows the tendency voting far-right, the core question here is: What makes Hungarian citizens preferring far-right governance? To answer this, we must question the existing literature that focuses on particular factors separately and combine them together, explaining through a post-communist lens, which will fill the gap in existing research. We will look at the systemic- and the socio-economic effects as well as the evolution of post-communist Hungarian politics, which can all together shape electoral behaviour, to highlight the wrongly narrow focus of existing literature.

Theory and Literature Review

My argument in this essay is that Fidesz’ rise is resulted by the votes of the elderly (who form the majority of those eligible to vote due to the communist baby-boom): those who live in rural areas, who have not entered higher education nor well-paying jobs and have experienced the Soviet communism (and have disappointed in democracy and its leaders as a result) (Sawyer, 2010; ESS, 2018a, 2018e, 2018i). Therefore, this essay will refer to a post-communist theoretical lens, whereby each factor that shapes the public’s party preference – particularly that of Fidesz voters – can be linked to the experience of the far-left Soviet regime.

Why am I focusing on the experience of the Soviet Union in connection with socio-economic differences, intergenerational value change and institutional changes and factors broadly all together? Each factor alone contributes to our understanding of Hungarian electoral behaviour. All of them can make us understand why the far-right Fidesz has emerged, yet existing literature has failed to connect these factors all together, to make an even clearer and more appropriate explanation. It is best to look at all these factors together because people – who vote – are complex creatures. Their opinion is shaped not only on one but on multiple levels – all well-discovered separately ––, which we need to take into account when making claims about the causation behind their vote (Inglehart, 2003; Turska-Kawa, 2013; Bertus, 2016).  Existing literature on this so far has discovered the unique nature of post-communist electoral-behaviour in Eastern Europe but has failed to explain the drastic rise of the far-right Fidesz in Hungary yet Hungary (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000). Scholars have also long been arguing the effects of the differences in socio-economic and social-class means (Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). Yet, this has been used for analysing all states and their electoral behaviour globally (or at least on Europe-level for sure), which therefore should not directly explain the unique far-right trends in the case of Hungary (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000). Instead, we must combine these studies of the different factors in order to get a clearer picture of the complex background of Fidesz-voters.

In the existing analysis Inglehart’s materialist-postmaterialist value cleavage points out correctly that less developed states – considered equal to if a state and its nation had ‘bad times’ with poor economic performance –, like Hungary are more materialist (2007). Scholars have also discovered that the responsibility hypothesis – whereby voters reward and/or punish governments – is not relevant in the case of Hungary (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000). This might be the result of the fact that economic performances – although often with a lack of Hungarian data – are not that relevant for voters when it comes to choosing a preferred political party (Harper, 2000). Yet, it is not clear why it is the case and why it changes electoral behaviour so powerfully. On the other hand, it is also proved that retrospective and issue voting increase over time and that Hungarian electoral behaviour tends to be leader-centric not ideological (Lippény, 2013; Tóka, 2006). This is confirmed by the institutional legacy of the USSR in the form of socialist parties and the negative welfare difference of Hungary from the West. Therefore, political preference is not shaped by socialist ideology but by welfare needs (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2012).  Yet, again it is not clarified why these factors specifically rule Hungarian party preferences. Each factor that the existing literature analyses creates pairs of winners and losers, left and right wings, materialism and postmaterialism or authoritarianism and libertarianism (Kubas, 2013; Inglehart, 2007; Lachat; 2013).

We must bring these all together to see why Hungary has a radical right, materialist and authoritarian rule, namely Fidesz. This is how this paper will try to fill the gap of the existing literature that forgets to connect the various factors as well as the post-Soviet framework that can shape party preference, which is crucial to see what really has an impact on contemporary Fidesz-supporters.

Results of the Research

First of all, we need to look at the root systemic effects of the Soviet Union. Hungary – one of the Eastern European post-socialist states –, like its fellows, has experienced the transition into democracy for various reasons. The transition from the full employment of the command economy straight to the competition of  capitalism and economic recession (result of the transition) was something, that the Hungarian population did not fight for (unlike the Western part of Europe, with revolutions for democracy) and did not experienced positively at all   (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005).

This is generally true in all post-Soviet Eastern European States, therefore not unique to Hungary. We, therefore, must not use this as a direct causation of the rise of the far-right Fidesz and Viktor Orbán. Yet, it is crucial to remember the background of those voters who today form the majority of those eligible to vote in Hungary (as a result of the Ratkó ‘baby boom’) and their anti-left bias as a result of the far-left Soviet regime. (Dinas and Northmore-Ball, 2019; Sawyer, 2010; Romsics, 2007). In post-Soviet countries the transition into democracy was not a result of a struggle for self-expression, therefore there are no healthy democracies in Eastern Europe – where voters tend to prefer far-right, conservative and nationalist parties – because they did not have the self-expression value before (Inglehart, 2003). Consequently, there is no democratic function. Not to mention the institutional legacy of the USSR in the form of socialist parties and the negative welfare difference of Hungary from the West (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2012). Therefore, political preference already is not shaped by socialist ideology but by this difference in comparison to non-post-Soviet Western states and increasingly by subjective factors of feelings and opinions and the left-right divide – developed on a socio-economic cleavage – that has brought a Fidesz versus MSZP bipolarity (Inglehart, 2003; Turska-Kawa, 2013).

Secondly, the socio-economic effects left behind by communism involve that the society had to turn from a guaranteed full-employment and the fairly monetary equality of society (where one did not have to work harder to become more than their neighbours), all the way to competition in jobs, market and wealth (Romsics, 2007). Unemployment has radically increased at the transition, which just added more to the dissatisfaction and disappointment in democracy and capitalism.  Here, we must analyse (1) the urban-rural, (2) educational (3) social-class and (4) religious differences all together – combining discourse and European Social Survey (ESS) data analysis – to be able to conclude the most accurate result based on the differences between Fidesz and non-Fidesz voters within society. These will help us to understand the materialist-postmaterialist, libertarian-authoritarian cleavages and the rise of the so-called ‘intergenerational’ change in value cleavage, how that cannot (yet) be represented in the aging society of Hungary (Inglehart, 2003, 2007; Sawyer, 2010; Romsics, 2007).

In terms of urban-rural divide, right-wing Fidesz voters – the elderly generation – live in rural areas, whereas the much more educated, left-wing younger generations live in Budapest (the capital) or one of the other large cities (Bertus, 2016; ESS, 2018a, 2018i). Here already we can see, urban-rural divide alone does not lead us to Fidesz supporters’ concerns, we must consider their age therefore, their year of birth. Those elderly, living in the rural areas who were born between 1950 and 1962 are the main Fidesz voters (ESS 2018i). For them, the left-right cleavage is the most determinative, whereas for the younger urban generations it is EU integration and other issues that they are concerned about (Walczak et al., 2011; ESS, 2018b, 2018h). It is also important to see that the elderly, who vote for Fidesz are mainly those whose highest level of education is secondary school (ESS, 2018a, 2018i). This brings the urban-rural divide together with age and level of education, each in connection with the others when we are describing electoral behaviour in post-Soviet Hungary. This is the result of the low education and high rates of rural jobs under communism, which brings us back to our post-Soviet theoretical lens (Romsics, 2007).

Religion has proved to be more important than social class, but again, we must bring in age groups as it is most important in the case of those voters born in and before 1950, who tend to be Fidesz-KDMP voters (ESS, 2018c, 2018f; Walczak et al., 2011).  Religion today is across parties with a medium importance and Catholic dominance, again rather between the elderly generations, not the more educated younger voters (ESS, 2018f, 2018i). Although, we might not connect this directly to the experience of the Soviet system, it is important to see the correlation between age and religion, which is a conservative, right-wing value (value of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition) (Szabó, 2011).

Therefore, as we can see age is a key in every aspect, which urges us to accept Inglehart’s theory of intergenerational change. Although, – as the most cited scholar in Politics – he has been wrong in asking voters about the likeliness of signing a petition in democracies only, which cannot analyse if self-expression caused democracy or the other way around as he uses very flood methods to make a very strong case. Still, he has been right in that Hungary is a less democratic and more concerned about survival than self-expression, as well as that younger generations experience a completely different political environment growing up. Therefore, Hungary is a materialist – or authoritarian – country after all, but this is only a misleading collective result without taking age groups into account (Inglehart, 2003; Lachat, 2017).  How then, could we analyse this all better? We could use individual level data exclusively and instead of asking scale questions, we could list the things voters dislike (the racial groups, etc.). Yet, the extreme majority presence of the elderly holds up materialism and the younger generations cannot be represented, who would bring postmaterialism and consequently, post-capitalism where consumerism needs to convince customers by supporting social causes (Inglehart, 2007). Analysing the ESS datasets, we can see that generational differences spread across all the other socio-economic factors (2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2018d, 2018e, 2018f, 2018g, 2018h, 2018i). The elderly Fidesz voters have lower emotional attachment to and need to remain in the EU. Yet surprisingly, latest data shows lower number of those whose income is their pension than for some other parties, such as Demokratikus Koalíció (Democratic Coalition) (ESS, 2018b, 2018d, 2018h). Age, again, we can see remains a key. No factor  affecting electoral behaviour should be analysed without considering the majority position of the elderly who have experienced the communism.

Last but not least, the evolution of politics in parliament since 1989 helps us to see, whether there are other factors that support the far-right majority in parliament, such as the democratisation, the switch to multi-party system or the 2012 modification of the constitution by the Fidesz government. Democratisation and the multi-party system, first of all, was new to the USSR citizens, who before, had no word in politics and the leadership (Anderson et al., 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005). Giving such a political freedom from one day to the other will not teach voters, how to make the decision in the polling booth, which will result in that – especially in a transition which brings economic recession and decrease in welfare – they will keep voting to a new party from the other side, making the left and right interchanging (Kubas, 2013). In Hungary, this was the case until 2010, since when the Fidesz government and Viktor Orbán keep holding the 2/3 majority (Országinfó, 2012). So, what has happened before the 2010 elections and ever since? The Fidesz-KDNP government with its 2/3 majority has changed the constitution to favour itself at elections and in legislation procedures (Zeldin, 2013). Fidesz is also known about its cheating at elections, using children for campaigning, giving away free food and social events in the countryside and mobilising unfairly larger number of campaigning people, blackmailing public servants with losing their job, etc. (Tóth, 2018; 444 news, 2019). This must be connected to the data that Fidesz voters are most likely to trust in their politicians, which therefore leads to their ‘easy going’ voting, they can be bought by these cheatings (ESS, 2018g).

The Hungarian electoral behaviour has been shaped by voters’ individual perceptions of the systemic (economic and socio-economic) and institutional (democratisation and multi-party politics), as well as the development and manipulating tools of Hungarian politics detailed above. Now that we understand the broad context of the transition from communism to democracy, we can see why voters – the elderly majority –  tend to turn towards the far-right Fidesz. We now know that those, who form the majority of voters have experienced the transition negatively and did not fight for democracy. They also tend to be less educated than younger generations and to be living in rural areas, as well as often criticise democracy based on the effects of capitalism and its inequalities caused by the competition (Bertus, 2016; ESS, 2018a, 2018i). Therefore, we must see that age, the socio-economic factor must always be brought into the analysis when it comes to analysing post-communist states, particularly Hungary.

Conclusion and looking forward

In a conclusion, based on the example of Hungary, the case of Eastern European post-communist electoral behaviour is a complex one, where economic, socio-economic and institutional changes all play a key role, probably alongside with individual, subjective opinions, based on unique life-experiences and backgrounds. Yet it is also important to mention that these results are only valid when it is about the ‘Soviet-generation’ of Hungary’s active voters. Age, year of birth, generation, all meaning the same measurement need to be brought into the picture when we are analysing the factors mentioned above, that affects party preference: Fidesz voters are mainly those born between 1950-1962, who happen to be the majority of the contemporary population due to the Ratkó pro-birth policies in the 1950s (Sawyer, 2010; Romsics, 2007). Later generations show a clear preference towards left-wing parties, yet they form a minority due to the later reduction in birth-rate (which is a side-effect of democratic capitalist economy where family planning is time consuming which costs money, but this is a topic for another study) (ESS, 2018i; Sawyer, 2010; Romsics, 2007). Therefore, even though we have discovered why radical far-right can gain an absolute power in Eastern European states where the experience of the transition into democracy was negative – making the positive feelings about the Soviet system stronger –, it does not reflect the whole population. To answer the main question: Hungary has the trend to vote for the far-right Fidesz due to the majority of those who have experienced the communism with mainly secondary education and who are manipulated in the countryside. Consequently, age must be a point in any type of analysis on electoral behaviour, in order to provide the true picture of the whole, not only the elderly majority. Without considering year of birth, the study will only represent the old, ‘Soviet generation’ who happen to be in a majority over the young and the future generation, controlling their politics and life under these influences we have explored. Democratisation supposed to mean a positive thing to the young, allowing all voices to be heard. Yet, in post-Soviet states it has resulted the opposite due to the principle of popular sovereignty (the majority decides).

Going forward, there is a need to analyse Hungarian far-right electoral behaviour considering the results of this essay and keeping in mind the importance of socio-economic factors – particularly age – as although, the party-preferences of those elderly ‘rule’ Hungarian  politics, they do not represent the population as a whole. This gives space for future change in electoral behaviour, when the younger generations will have the position to gain majority.  

Post-Soviet Eastern European states should never be analysed via Western European lenses, as their background and therefore, attitude towards democracy itself will always differ (Anderson, et al., 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005).

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