Political Enqniry in International Relations
Electoral
Behaviour in Hungary: What Kind of External Factors Affect Certain Voters When
They Come to Put Their ‘X’ on the Ballot Paper?
Abstract
There are
endless number of researches on electoral behaviour, but they tend to miss an
important fact when it comes to analysing post-communist states: they have not fought
for their democracy and have experienced the transition into it negatively.
This makes voters to look at democracy and its electoral system completely
differently from those in the West, yet they are analysed based on the same
socio-economic factors. Therefore, I find it important that – instead of the
collective, majority ruled data on electoral behaviour – we ask people, what
their reasons behind their votes are. Politicians are starving for information
about what people want, what they think, because they need to represent those
to win elections. They cannot do that based on pure numerical data, they need
to ask their citizens. Similarly, we need to ask people about their motives, it
does not come through any generalised, mass socio-economic dataset. It differs
person by person, and even if a qualitative interview-based research will not
allow us to generalise, this is a much better method to be used in order to
demonstrate the importance of the individual, unique motives behind each vote.
To verify this, I have chosen to analyse interviews with Hungarian voters from
different backgrounds, who have participated in the 2018 Parliamentary
Elections, where Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party got re-elected with 2/3 absolute majority
for the third time. This analysis has led a surprising combination of lack of
engagement with the preferred party’s actions, with absolute all-time engagement
to it.
Introduction
This research focuses on the following: apart from socio-economic factors
(level of education, family-status, place of living, age, class, occupation and
income) what external factors may affect certain Hungarian voters to (not) vote
for the so-called ‘illiberal’ Fidesz-party, which have acquired its absolute
majority for the third time (Hungarian
National Election Office, 2017; Grzebalska
and Pető, 2018). I will do so by conducting qualitative semi-structured
interviews, involving four voters who have participated in the latest, 2018 parliamentary
elections. The reason for this is that I have discovered that the existing
quantitative literature cannot capture the variety of specific individual
reasons behind votes, they can only show the ‘bigger picture’ (the collective
trends) based mostly on socio-economic factors, mentioned previously. They
usually analyse electoral behaviour without inquiring about those voters’
reasons and motives, and work mainly based on their Western centric socio-economic
data, that cannot fit countries which have previously belonged to the Soviet
bloc (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier,
2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka,1998; Benoit, 2005). I have found that, what really
matters on the day of elections is what voters really think, that is why
politicians are hunting public opinion and needs (which is getting harder to
read), to find out what they need to represent to get elected (Mair, 2009).
I had a question
come across when I have started this project: why not only Fidesz voters? During
the process, I have realised then I could have not demonstrate how the ideas of
Fidesz voters, who have lived under the communist system differ from those who
did not and experienced only this existing democratic system of Hungary, which
I now find crucial and targeted to be my next research’s focus point (Fidesz
voters born in or before 1970, so were old enough to understand politics in the
communist system).
Finally, the
main research question is then: other than socio-economic status, what do
certain voters in contemporary Hungary truly think, therefore what does
externally affect their ‘X’ on the ballot paper? I will go after the
interviewee’s thoughts on their major decision-factors by asking them about
whether they have been affected by certain issue-responses of a party, by personal
ideology, economic concerns, benefits or vouchers that they are eligible for,
by personal relationships with the party, any manifesto, leaflet, campaign or a
personal experience, and whether it was a strategic vote. What this research
aims to find is therefore that certain voters do not vote as they do simply
because of their socio-economic situation, but they have individual
experiences, needs and personalities behind as well, what cannot be exposed in
mass-data analysis. We can only perceive those by asking them.
Literature review
First, it is important to understand what the traditional literature on party-voting
says to be able to understand the singularity of Hungary. Then, in comparison
we need to look at specifically what the literature on the Hungarian electoral
system says, because the mainstream literature focuses on a collective,
generalised European lens that is dominated by those Western states who have
not experienced the Soviet system, whereas Hungary and its voters very much did
so, therefore they have a very different relation to and experience with
democracy as such (Anderson, Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005).
A traditional,
Western literature on party-voting builds on those countries where there was no
Soviet involvement in governance, where there was no socialism after the end of
World War II. They build on a responsibility hypothesis, claiming that voters
vote based on the government’s performance, vote for if they see developments
that favours them, and against if they are unsatisfied. That is rewarding and
punishing a government (Ahlquist et al.,
2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and
Jansen 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). Which is not the case in the
Eastern European countries including Hungary, where democracy did not come
about as a result of public struggle, where there has been no long lasting
positive experience with democracy (Anderson,
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005). In
Hungary, there is no such punishment for Fidesz’ reforms what has been revealed
above (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc,
2000).
Twenty-eight
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I should find evidence on Kiss’s
argument, that strategic voting is increasing over time, so interviewees must
have logical reasons based on what they expect to benefit them, behind their
votes (2015:131). Most importantly
for this research, there has been some rudimentary finding on that government
manipulates voters by gender- and family policies to strengthen its
counter-hegemony and also, there has been increase in corruption at elections (Grzebalska and Pető, 2018; Kostadinova, 2009).
Not to mention the unfair modification of electoral laws on governmental
campaign, allocation of campaign funds and media restrictions by the
Fidesz-government for their own benefit to manipulate electoral behaviour (OSCE ODIHR, 2018).
We can conclude
that the existing literature analyses electoral behaviour based on voters’ pure
socio-economic ‘fact’ data, not by asking them what their motives, reasons,
tensions are, which actually matters when it comes to voting, what voters
think, that is what politicians are striving for, opinions, needs, thoughts of
voters because that is what matters when they give an ‘X’ on the day of
elections, not where they come from.
Methodology
This research aims to find that apart from socio-economic factors, there
are specific, individual reasons behind certain voters’ party preferences that
cannot be measured by generalised mass-data analysis and can only be perceived
by asking voters one by one. For this purpose, I will use the method of
semi-structured interviews, whereby participants are invited via social media
advertising to participate voluntarily. The reason for my method to be used is
what we could see from the literature review, that the socio-economic data and
Western centric research cannot demonstrate the specific individual reasons
behind a vote. This, in the end resulted four completed interviews, each with a
citizen who have voted in the 2018 General Parliamentary Elections.
I have found
that this method is weak in what it is strong: although does not allow me to
conclude any general assumption about the whole Hungarian population, therefore
gives only a very limited and focused result; yet is better to capture
individual reasons behind certain votes, what the general ‘bigger picture’
would miss as it relies on the data of the majority of the cases and on
socio-economic factors. No other, minority voices are heard in case of
quantitative analysis Hungary (Burnham et
al., 2008, pp. 123-124; Halperin and Heath, 2012, pp. 253-285).
In my analysis I
have compared those points of the interviews with each other which were answers
to the same question. The aim of this is that apart from a single-analysis of
each, it gives an even better understanding to compare different interviewed
voters to each other, how their reasons differ and why. Even though I was
hesitating on including non-Fidesz voters because I have been suggested that
excluding them would further narrow down and deepen this research, eventually
an LMP voter has been involved in order to discover, whether in the case of
these interviewees her socio-economic factors made the difference or it can be
rejected. This is important to reveal for comprehending which, the
socio-economic quantitative, the personal thought-based qualitative path, or
maybe both are influential on electoral behaviour; what we could not get if we
only look at the three Fidesz voters (as they are nearly from the same age- and
residence group, which was accidental). Nevertheless, I have interrogated the
interviewees on their socio-economic data for the same reason, to get confirmed
or rejected on the usefulness of my method.
This research
may involve ethical issues on inconvenience or discomfort of either the
interviewer or the interviewee due to the topic or the other party’s
inappropriate behaviour at the interview. Also, there will be a risk of overreporting
of those participants who abstain claiming they voted, when the reality might
not be the same (Kostadinova, 2009). Finally,
there is a risk that the translated transcription may have misheard data, or
that the interviewee was not telling the truth when answering some questions. Yet,
for the purpose of this analysis, I have found the advantages more promising
than the relevance of these backlashes.
Analysis
Interviewee A was the only non-Fidesz voter participant in this research.
She was not interested in politics that much to quest for about parties’
manifestos, policies or economic goals, she was only intended to change the
current governance when it came to elections. She has differed in all socio-economic
respects from the other interviewees: in age, location of living, occupation. Her
contrast with the other interviewees may have confirmed the generalised
mass-research data, that the younger, urban population is more likely to be
against the far-right regime, whereas the older, rural resident generation is
more likely to support Fidesz (Lippényi,
Maas and Jansen 2013); but it is important to add the fact that she was the
only one who did not experience the communist system. These together may have
led to such anti-Fidesz perspective, in her case.
Interviewee B
was very much interested in political news and was concerned with economic
development. Due to her occupation as an auditor, she was immensely up-to-date
on company related policies and taxation, strongly bearing out her party
preference. She was the only interviewee somewhat engaged with the governing
party, which is ‘…although slowly, but doing good to the Hungarian economy’,
according to her.
Interviewee C on
the other hand, has shown very little interest in politics, declared to be
informed only because ‘…it is coming from the newspaper and the radio every
day’, as something unavoidable. She felt that she was not affected by the
support and benefits that comes from the government because those are targeting
the younger generation, who ‘need extra to build up a home and to start a
family, standard living is not enough for additional hungry mouths, but we, the
old, the retired people would need so much less, only as much to keep up our
living standard as if we were still working, but we get nothing’. I understood
a certain upset here. Yet she was concerned with Fidesz, because it worth more
for her to keep a government that already ‘packed its pockets enough, …
[because] a new government would start it again’; than the fact that she feels
that her years in retirement are not safe and guaranteed.
Interviewee D
said he was ‘…of course interested in politics as long as it affects the
Hungarian economy’. Similar to interviewee C, he was not impressed with the
party’s values and direction, yet agreed with their immigration policy and seen
no better option to vote for – for the same ‘new leadership would start to fill
their empty pockets, whereas Fidesz have already filled theirs enough’ theory.
In Table 1 we can compare the four interviewees’ responses to
each other, whereby we can see that in all four cases there was a tendency to
vote for the same party on both, the single-member district list and the
party-list. Likewise, none of the interviewees declared to have any kind of
personal relationship to any member of any party and said being not active in
politics apart from reading the news and voting. Also, none of my interviewees
have been visited by any party-representative personally, that could have influenced
their party preferences. This may confirm the drawback of interview-based
research, where picking four random people will not always confirm the ‘bigger
picture’ what politicians or other researches may see, if there is accidentally
no such particular voter within the interviewees. In a contrast, whereas for
the young and urban interviewee A the main driver behind her vote was to defeat
the majoritarian power of Fidesz, for the other three older, rural living Fidesz
voters the main point unanimously was the economy and its development.
Apart from
interviewee C, both the LMP voter and the Fidesz voters have criticised the
government on different levels, but all of them said there is not much chance for
any kind of change. Here I see a certain acceptance of ‘their bad situation’,
that needs to be criticised by them, but none of them are willing to do any
effective action for change, either because it is ‘risky’ to do so or because
there is no really a better option, they believe; but they have certainly not
voted because they are engaged with the party they have chosen. In addition,
although all four interviewees declared to be to some extent interested in
politics, but not being actively involved in it. This most probably means that
none of them are unsatisfied with the existing system that much that would make
them taking action. These finding have confirmed Kiss’s argument on the
increase of strategic voting, because all interviewees found that their party
preference at the election was at least to some extent strategic (2015:131). On one hand, the LMP voter’s
strategy was regime-change without party engagement. On the other hand, all Fidesz
voters (interviewee B, C and D) have voted for Fidesz at the elections because
they are in power for a significant time now and a change in leadership would
re-start the development and ‘stealing’ by the representatives, as they said.
Therefore, a main point behind all three Fidesz-votes was to keep the existing system
going because changing it would do more harm than good. Also, they all had
various concerns about Fidesz, one felt that her retirement will not be
guaranteed, two of them said they are ‘stealing’ or the system is not perfect.
Yet none of these points overruled their concern that they need to keep the
Fidesz government because a new government would destroy the development that
has been built up, to start everything from scratch, and would start to ‘fill
their empty pockets’. For all of them it is the best way if Fidesz – who
already have stolen enough money to be happy with it and who has commenced to
build up a system of development – keeps doing what it does because ‘…it is slow,
but it is development what they are doing’ (Interviewee
B). By this they verify that Hungary as a post-socialist country needs
different analysis from those in the West, because here there is no punishment
for the government by those voters who have lived under communism before (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000).
Within these interviews then, we could see a confirmation of the
influential nature of socio-economic status (particularly age and location of
residence) on electoral behaviour, that was meant to be rejected. But age as a
factor here can be associated with experiencing (or not) the communist system,
which then is relevant on accessing democracy and therefore party preferences.
Still, in addition, the hypothesis that there are other external factors
influencing the outcome of party choice has also been verified by those
interviewed, therefore we can declare a partial, but significant success in
this research. This then demonstrates the need for an interview-based analysis
of Hungarian (as well as post-Eastern bloc) electoral behaviour, as a result of
that quantitative (socio-economic based) data cannot uncover all factors behind
individual votes. For the participants of this research these external factors
influencing their vote have been mainly concerns about economy and the strategy
that they must keep the existing system and government going because a new
government would first, stop this slow but constant development to build up a
new system of their ideas; second, because a new government would have ‘empty
pockets to fill with stolen money’ and the long-running Fidesz government has ‘already
filled its pockets so that it does not want more’. This was true for Fidesz
voter interviewees, but for the single LMP-voter (who has differed in that she
has not experienced the communist Hungary and lived in urban area), it was even
more purely based on a strategy, where the only thing that mattered was to vote
against Fidesz, and to vote for those with the best chance to get the most
votes of the opposition. These are the interviewees’ thoughts behind their ‘X’,
that cannot be concluded from any Western-centric social-economic, generalised
collection of data, it varies person by person.
Conclusion
In a conclusion, we can now see that even though socio-economic factors
(age, sex, location of living, occupation) do make a difference in electoral
behaviour of those interviewed, voters have their own thoughts, needs and
interests behind it as well that needs to be analysed.
Interviewed Fidesz voters were not necessarily engaged with the party’s
values, rather seen the strategy of keeping the existing regime their best
option, because they have believed that a new government would restart
‘stealing money’ as well as the development of the economy. The opposition
voter – who alone did not experience the communist system – similarly build on
a strategy, voted for the strongest opposition party (not necessarily engaged
with), LMP, which was seen as the best chance for regime-change. For the
purpose of this analysis I had to include an opposition voter, to be able to
represent how all voters of all parties from all backgrounds interviewed here
have shown little or no engagement (with one Fidesz voter exception) with the
party’s values that they have voted for. Instead there is a tendency to vote
strategically to keep or to change the status quo regime of Orbán. It has
confirmed the increase of strategic voting on this narrow level of four
participants, as well as the need for the interview-based research on electoral
behaviour in Hungary (Kiss, 2015).
Quantitative socio-economic data may show trends but cannot represent the true
reasons of individuals behind their vote (Anderson,
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka,1998; Benoit, 2005).
This research has confirmed that those Fidesz voters who have experienced
the communist system have a different approach to democratic parties. Therefore,
there is a need for further research on those Fidesz voters particularly born
in or before 1970, having experienced both systems.
Table
1
Interviewee A
|
Interviewee B
|
Interviewee C
|
Interviewee D
|
|
Sex, age, location of living, family status,
level of education, occupation
|
Female, 21, urban, alone, secondary
education completed, student
|
Female, 63, urban, alone, higher education
completed, white collar worker
|
Female, 58, rural, in family, secondary
education completed, white collar worker
|
Male, 64, rural, in family, secondary
education completed, blue collar worker
|
How much are you actively involved in
politics?
|
interested, reads the news, used to joined
demonstrations, now it is too risky to do so
|
interested, reads the news daily on both
domestic and international politics, but not actively involved in anything
|
not interested, sees the news and hears the
radio so has an idea what is going on, but not particularly going into it
|
not active apart from voting, interested
only as much as it affects the economy, nothing else is important
|
Which party did you vote for in 2018?
|
LMP on both lists
|
Fidesz on both lists
|
Fidesz on both lists
|
Fidesz on both lists
|
Was it affected by certain issues they
responded the best to?
|
not at all, does not read about the party that
deeply
|
yes, Fidesz takes the economy in a good
direction, a new government would break it all down and start from scratch,
Fidesz is doing slow but constantly better
|
no, she sees that the party just works on
how to ensure all powerful party-members get a stable position in the state
as heads of companies, governmental departments or any other major position
|
he agrees with the policies on immigration,
but finds it to be a marketing catch mainly
|
Was it affected by your personal ideological
engagement?
|
to a limited extent LMP represents the most
of her views
|
not at all, if it would be the case, she
would have joined the party a long time ago
|
to a limited extent it has affected her vote
in that she is against immigration because ‘we are enough here’ and Fidesz
represents her view on it the best
|
he used to identify himself with the party,
but not anymore since their values have changed, yet there is no better party
as for now
|
Was it affected by economic factors?
|
no, because she does not know what other parties
if come to power could do for her the question of economy comes after the
question of democracy and this is not a democracy yet where economy could be
debated
|
Fidesz leads an internationally recognised
development, Hungary develops the best and fastest compared to other Eastern
European states, Fidesz develops the economy, which is the main point for her
when it comes to vote
|
there is good and bad in the contemporary
economy, the main point is that they are talking but do nothing, there must
be good things in it, but she did not know what exactly
|
absolutely, main point is the economy,
Fidesz have got the money they wanted already, so will not want more, if a
new party would come to power, they would want the money again
|
Was it affected by their manifesto or
certain policies?
|
not at all, the only goal is to change the
current regime, LMP has not been in power to write policies
|
not at all, the only point is to keep the
economic development going
|
she does not believe in any manifesto or
campaign text, speech, prefers the immigration policy and family support
policies but disagrees with the pension age-limit policy
|
he has decided way before any campaign or
manifesto, does not matter what they would say they do not keep their word
|
Was it affected by what the government gives
to you?
|
those benefits do not affect her in this age
yet, therefore this does not give a reason for her to vote for Fidesz, she is
sure there would be some support for families and pensioners anyway
|
there is more and more financial support for
starting a family, for housing, for grandparents to stay home with the
grandchildren, now that the party stayed in power and reached development can
focus on families and healthcare more, it could not be done all at once, now
that there is development, families can have more children that will lead to
more school and more job for teachers, before they needed to focus on the
industry to establish jobs for parent-to-be-s, based on her auditor job she
is aware on all taxation that makes workers’ situation better, the vouchers
have just ceased to push companies to pay that amount in the salary, so that
the worker gets the same but now with tax, she personally is not affected by
any voucher, GYES [maternity leave] or CSOK [governmental loan for family
housing], she is not eligible for those
|
was not affected by any support or benefit
(GYES, CSOK) as has not been eligible for those, have not received any
vouchers that are now being cancelled
|
yes, it is connected with the economy, but
supporting benefits, vouchers are not relevant to him, he is not eligible,
and he thinks benefits for the old have eliminated
|
Was it a strategic vote?
|
absolutely, voting for the opposition that
had the best chance to win, if it was any other opposition-party, she would
have vote for them
|
strategic for keeping up the development, a
new party would go back to zero and start again just to do differently
|
strategic in terms of that it does not worth
it to change the regime because new regime means a new party that is freshly
hungry for money
|
to an extent, it is strategic because they
have stolen enough money already and do not want more, a new party would
start stealing again
|
Was it affected by anything else?
|
LMP was seen as the best chance of the
opposition to win more seats, they are not really good either, but the best
chance to change the Fidesz-regime, the Momentum-party was more convincing
for her but had less chances, LMP is sympathetic because the party-leader’s
children go to the same private-school as she did instead of the governmental
education, no representative of the party knocked on her door personally
|
Fidesz is not perfect either, they have some
lacks and unable to develop all sectors at once, but do it slowly, step by
step, they are making taxation more transparent, there is no need for
surveillance or punishment, instead market depends on being a good taxpayer,
that ensures purchase, nothing else apart from economic development have
affected her vote, no representative of the party knocked on her door personally
|
was not affected by anything else, no
representative of the party knocked on her door personally
|
he has not been affected by campaign
leaflets or party promises and no representative of the party knocked on his
door personally
|
Do you have personal relationship to any
member of the party?
|
no
|
no
|
no
|
no
|
What do you expect form the next elections
in 2022?
|
Fidesz will keep its majority, maybe not
with 2/3
|
wishing for Fidesz-majority because she
wants economic development and they are doing it well, no need nor chance for
regime-change
|
will not be a miracle, there will be no
major change nor a new perfect party will born from nothing, the most
important thing is the further support of the young, the retired would be as
well but the young needs extra for building a home and a family whereas a
pensioner would only need a basic standard of living that they could live
when they were working
|
Fidesz will keep staying in its absolute
power, there is too high cult of personality around Orbán; but also he have
always conformed to what is there, if it was socialism or if it is democracy,
the only thing what matters that someone should give promises that they
actually deliver, nothing else matters, who or which party it is
|
(the table
includes key parts of the interviewees’ thoughts on the questions)
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