Post-Transition Electoral Behaviour of Fidesz Voters

 

Politics Dissertation

Post-Transition Electoral Behaviour: How Does the Experience of the Soviet Communism Have an Impact on Contemporary Fidesz Voters’ Electoral Behaviour in Hungarian Democracy?

Abstract

In Hungary, the far-right Fidesz is in an absolute 2/3 majority since 2010. Scholars have discovered that they are supported by the elderly generation – those who have a pre-transition communist past. They also argue about this phenomenon based on the Western economic voting model and economic concerns. Yet, it is often ignored that Eastern European countries have a different past and perception about liberal democracy. 

Post-transition electoral behaviour must not be analysed purely through the lens of the economic voting model but also, based on the individual-level past experience, which shapes political choices, too. This dissertation will demonstrate that the economic voting model is a good tool for analysis in most of the elderly Fidesz supporters’ cases, but there is a gap where it is unable to explain the motivation behind when it is a result of an anti-left attitude that comes from the experience with pre-transition the far-left governance.

I. Introduction

 

In European electoral behaviour studies it has become common to use the economic voting model as a tool for analysis, which argues that voters cast their ballots based on their own economic preferences and how close a party is to that opinion of theirs (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). Yet, this model is Western-centric on multiple grounds and does not take into account the differences of those states in Eastern Europe with a communist past. 

Therefore, this dissertation will analyse the extent to which the Eurocentric economic voting model fits post-transition Easter European countries’ electoral behaviour, focusing on Hungary and the governing Fidesz party – as one of the most often attacked ‘anti-democratic’ right-wing regimes within the European Union (EU) –, particularly its main voters: the elderly (Hutton, 2017; Goydych, 2018; RT, 2017; Farkas, n.d.; Glamser, 1978; Dassonneville, 2017; Enyed, Fábián and Tardos, 2014; European Social Survey, 2014, 2018). I will focus on this group because (1) they help the far-right Fidesz to remain in power and because (2) their communist far-left experience’s influence on their electoral behaviour can have a similar impact in any post-transition Eastern European country, where economic voting is not a complete answer. Consequently, the core question of this study is: how does the experience of the Soviet communism have an impact on contemporary Fidesz voters’ electoral behaviour in Hungarian democracy?

 

In order to answer this question and see whether my analysis supports, rejects or advises us to extend the economic voting model, I will first introduce the existing literature on European electoral behaviour. Also, I will highlight how the economic voting model ignores the unique past of post-transition countries, where democracy did not come smoothly and caused a lot of suffering (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005). 

Secondly, I will present why a qualitative interview-based research will help us to address and overcome the limitations of the economic voting model when it comes to Eastern European electoral behaviour of those with a socialist past in their memory as comparison. Quantitative methods – like the economic model – or other qualitative methods – such as document and archival analysis – do not ask the real individual thoughts behind each ‘X’ (Burnham et al., 2008: 123-124; 208-212; Halperin and Heath, 2012: 253-285).

Third, the first chapter of analysis will focus on the effects of the pre-transition negative experience on the economic voting trends by looking at the interviews. Economic voting model will only be relevant in the case of those interviewees (A, C, D, and E) who did not have a negative opinion about the pre-transition system at the time and – apart from interviewee D – enhanced their post-transition career and welfare. Yet, in the case of interviewee B the economic voting model fails to explain the anti-left political beliefs which has been resulted by the negative experience with both, pre- and post-transition left-wing governance.

Fourth, similarly through the interviews I will analyse how the post-transition positive experience (propagated career and welfare) commits to increasing protectionism and therefore, conservativism and support for Fidesz – even if that ‘wealth’ is only subjectively ‘more’ than before, not in comparison to others (Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Han, 2016). Therefore, a positive (interviewee A, C and E) or acceptive (interviewee D) post-transition attitude leads to economic voting trends. Yet, the existing model does not only undermine anti-left political preferences but is also unable to uncover the path to economic preferences. For this reason, I will bring in voter-psychology of dichotomy to demonstrate that a ‘positive’ experience needs to be in comparison to a ‘negative’ example (Mandler and Mandler, 1974; Elbow 1993). Here again, only the elderly voters who have experience with a far-left wing governance have such juxtaposition, who now tend to support the far-right, but are the most important for this study (Farkas, n.d.; Glamser, 1978; Dassonneville, 2017; Enyed, Fábián and Tardos, 2014; European Social Survey, 2014, 2018).

Fifth, in a discussion I will controvert and conclude the different parings of negative and positive pre- and post-transition voter opinions. Each combination will be compatible with the economic voting model (positive pre- and post-transition attitudes, positive pre- but negative post-transition views, negative pre- but positive post-transition thoughts), but in the case of negative pre- and negative post-transition attitude (interviewee B) it will not be applicable. Also, it will be important that these pre- and post-transition feelings about left- and right-wing governance – even when voting is based on economic concerns – is true only for the elderly, who now support the far-right Fidesz government (Farkas, n.d.; Glamser, 1978; Dassonneville, 2017; Enyed, Fábián and Tardos, 2014; European Social Survey, 2014, 2018).

 

            This study will come to the conclusion that my argument is needful for extending the economic voting model in Easter European electoral behaviour studies. Contemporary scholars on European electoral behaviour need to take the individual pre- and post-transition experiences and opinions into account when analysing Easter European states, whose elderly generation’s past is different from those in the West. I am contributing to the field by addressing these limitations and stressing the need for further considerations in electoral behaviour studies.

II. Literature Review

 

Answering how the experience of the Soviet communism has an impact on contemporary electoral behaviour of Fidesz voters in Hungarian democracy is needed to fill the gap in Western-centric literature on Eastern European electoral behaviour. We will see how scholars tend to focus on Western values of materialism-postmaterialism and left-right axes, which may suit those states who were fighting for their democracy but not those who have experienced the transition negatively (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005; Lewis-Becket and Paldam. 2000). Even though, the existing findings may be applicable in the case of Hungary, we must look at the qualitative side of it, the voters’ own experience and thoughts in order to see whether it is the case or there is a need for an extended or maybe a completely different approach in the case of Eastern European electoral behaviour. The argument here is therefore that we need to answer the question whether the Western-centric rational economic voting model and its quantitative results fit the post-transition Hungary in order to see its significance.

First of all, it is crucial to understand the traditional literature on both, the collective European and the more limited Eastern European party-voting to be able to understand the singularity of Hungary. Then, we will be able to look at what the literature on the Hungarian electoral system specifically says, to see how the mainstream literature focuses on a collective, generalised European lens that is dominated by those Western states who have not experienced the Soviet system, whereas Hungary and its voters very much did so, therefore they have a very different relation to and experience with democracy as such (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005; Lewis-Becket and Paldam. 2000).

 

A traditional, Western literature on party-voting builds on those countries where there was no Soviet involvement in governance, where there was no socialism after the end of World War II. They build on a responsibility hypothesis, claiming that voters vote based on the government’s – economic – performance, vote for if they see developments which favour them, and against if they are unsatisfied. By this they mean the rewarding and punishing of a government based on its performance (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994).

Others in the Western literature argue that people vote based on their identity associated with a party and its agenda or to the left-right axes (Massetti, 2009; Green and Baltes, 2017). Whether each of these bases for analysing electoral behaviour are correct – we can see it is more complex than one single factor, confirming that – we need to look at voters’ own thoughts to check which theory explains a specific group of voters of a country. They all might be relevant but for all different cases. Although, this is not the case in most post-Soviet Eastern European countries – including Hungary –, where democracy did not come about as a result of public struggle, where there has been no long lasting positive experience with democracy (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005; Lewis-Becket and Paldam. 2000). In Hungary, there is no such punishment for Fidesz’ reforms what has been revealed above (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000).  

Eastern European post-Soviet electoral behaviour has been shaped by the experience of hardship during the transition in both, institutional (democracy) and economic (capitalism) terms, resulting low turnout and low electoral stability (Tóka, 2006; Tavits, 2005). Post-Soviet elections has been and supposed to be shaped by interchanging left and right-wing leadership as a result of the dissatisfaction of the hardship of the transition (Kubas, 2013). This is often the case in European electoral behaviour as well but in Hungary, this was only the case until 2010 (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, n.d.).

In addition, according to Inglehart and Baker: 

‘… [t]he experience of most Soviet successor states does not support’ [the explication that economic development contributes to superior degrees of self-expression values which results advanced levels of democracy]. ‘Since their dramatic move toward democracy in 1991, the people of most of these societies have not become more trusting, more tolerant, happier, or more Postmaterialist: for the most part, they have moved in exactly the opposite direction, with the sharp decline of their economy and society.’ (in Inglehart, 2003: 56)

Even though, it has started to be argued that the justifiability of studying ‘Eastern Europe’ as such is now – two decades after transition – questionable, here this term covering post-Soviet European states will be used for analysis. The reason for this is that other measure-groups would include non-post-Soviet states or exclude some of those which were part of the Soviet Union, whereas this study goes after particularly the causation of the experience of the Soviet rule on electoral behaviour (Tucker, 2014).  

 

Within this context, Hungary particularly has been the very first nation – alongside Poland – to receive high attention from the central European institutions, as well as checks (of EU fund spending) regulations and charges for going against the EU agreement of refugee intake (Hutton, 2017; Goydych, 2018; RT, 2017). The rise of far-right nationalism and Orbán’s so-called ‘illiberalism’ has become disconcerting. Yet, we do not know why it is the case that Fidesz does not get ‘punished’ for spending on stadiums instead of hospitals nor for being charged with electoral cheating and its different forms from using children for campaign to paying for votes and asking for photo proof of the ballot paper on which there is a valid ‘X’ for Fidesz (Kingsley and Novak, 2019; Tóth, 2018). Electoral cheating by Fidesz is openly known in Hungary. It is often captured by opposition or independent media, but we can also find anonymised interviews with those – mainly retired people – who have got a few weeks of free holiday for their vote (Balavány, 2018; 444 news, 2019; Zsíros, 2019).

Most importantly, democratisation and the multi-party system was unknown to the USSR citizens, who did not have a word in politics and governance before (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005). Introducing this political freedom from one day to the next did not teach voters how to form their decisions in the polling booth, which results in that – particularly in a transition that brings economic recession and decline in welfare – they will keep voting interchangeably for the opposite side that is not in government at each election, making the left and right alternating (Kubas, 2013). In Hungary, this was the case until 2010, since when the Fidesz government and Viktor Orbán keep holding the 2/3 majority (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, n.d.). Later, the same Fidesz government with its plenipotentiary absolute majority has changed the constitution to favour itself at elections and in legislation procedures (Zeldin, 2013). They have also used the power to ban gender studies – destroying the liberal Central European University’s operation –, gender recognition and to silence the opposition by punishing scare-mongering with a minimum of 5-year prison sentence under their new COVID-19 ruling by decree (Pető, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2019, n.d.; Gall, 2020; Mudde, 2020; Dam, 2020). This anti-democratic governance within the EU cannot be ignored. Again, in order to be able to react in an effective way on both the EU and global levels, we must understand the underlying cause of Fidesz’ uninterrupted victory since 2010 (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, n.d.). 

In the case of Hungary, scholars have explained (1) which socio-economic group is the major supporter of Fidesz, (2) what their position is compared to other voters, and (3) what they are motivated by. In Hungary, due to the declining birth-rates, the majority of those who can vote are the elderly, who have experienced the communist regime. The elderly are likely to live in the countryside, whereas the younger generation in urban areas, therefore there is a tendency of left-wing preferences in the capital and right-wing preference in the countryside (Bertus, 2016). This may be true from the Western analysis in Hungary as well, but we do not know, if the reasons behind differ. The level of education has also been proved to be a relevant factor, in which younger generations have more opportunities, resulting more liberalism in their electoral behaviour. Consequently, compared to other voters they form a significant majority, therefore if they have a common party preference, their will is likely to rule the elections (Kudas, 2013). The most difficult question yet is their motivation. Some still argue, economic performance does not matter in Hungarian electoral behaviour (Harper, 2000). Yet others declare that empirical data clearly confirms economic voting (Tavits, 2005).  This research will fill this gap in the existing literature introduced above by going after whether the Western-centric models of electoral behaviour and the result of quantitative data analysis are true in the case of Hungarian Fidesz voters.

 

To sum up, the case of Eastern European post-communist electoral behaviour is a complex one, where economic, socio-economic and institutional changes all play a key role (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005). Yet it is also crucial to mention that these results are only valid when it is about the ‘Soviet-generation’ of Hungary’s active voters. Later generations show a clear preference towards left-wing parties, yet they form a minority due to the reduction in birth-rate (which is a side-effect of the capitalist economy where family planning is time consuming which costs money, but this is a topic for another study) (European Social Survey, 2014, 2018; Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2012: 7-13). Therefore, even though we now know how it can be the case in Eastern European states – where the experience of the transition into democracy was obnoxious, making the negative feelings about the left-wing system stronger –, that the elder majority ‘rules’ the election outcomes, it does not reflect the whole population. It only represents the old ‘Soviet generation’ who happen to be in a majority over the young future generation, controlling their politics and life under these influences. Democratisation supposed to mean a positive matter to the young, allowing all voices to be heard. Yet, in post-soviet states it has resulted the opposite due to the principle of popular sovereignty (the majority decides). 

Each and every one of the pieces of research analysed above have demonstrated how the fact that these countries of Europe have experienced another – namely socialist – form of economy and governance has an impact on contemporary electoral behaviour. Yet, existing literature on the far-right trends in Hungarian electoral behaviour remain uncovered by quantitative, Western-focused analysis. Therefore, we must ask voters themselves to understand how their decisions are shaped by being post-Soviet citizens. We must understand the causation of the widely explored correlation in order to see whether the existing broad range of analysis is right in the case of a post-transition country, Hungary. It will help us to understand the supporters of the far-right Fidesz more, individually based on their own words, thoughts and experience. This is important if one will need to step up against a dangerous far-right leadership by providing some information – which although cannot be generalised – that can help decrease the support in the mind of voters. Analysing deeper and more qualitatively such a leadership’s support is important particularly in the lights of the Second World War and its brutality, where a far-right regime (Hitler and his party in Germany) led to a global suffering and long-lasting consequences (Geary, 2000; Romsics, 2007: 123-172). I am not arguing that this will be the case of a much less powerful state like Hungary, but it might be useful in future unexpected events, and will remind us whether rational choice theory can be taken for granted as a one-size-fits all explanation in electoral behaviour, or there is more behind.

 

In this research, a comparative method will help us best to understand whether the existing models of analysis on electoral behaviour fit the supporters of the populist Fidesz – used to be representing liberalism, before changing to far-right nationalism –, who got so strong to keep its 2/3 majority for the third time in a row (Orosz, 2015). This qualitative analysis here will either support, reject or extend the methods which need to be used when analysing Eastern European electoral behaviour, in the case of those, who have experienced the (far-left) Soviet system and now support the far-right. I will try to fill the gap of the existing literature on the cause behind these tendencies in Hungary’s electoral behaviour, focusing on the most powerful socio-economic group: the elderly – who tend to fuel Fidesz’ status and – who have born in 1971 or earlier, therefore have experienced the Soviet system with a fairly mature mind. I will analyse the interviews of Fidesz voters individually and in comparison to each other, looking for relevant differences and similarities, hoping to find a pattern what causes the far-right trends between those who – form the majority of voters and – have experienced the far-left communism. I aim to find the answer to the question of this dissertation: how does the experience of the Soviet communism have an impact on contemporary electoral behaviour of Fidesz voters in ‘democratic’ Hungary?

III. Methodology

 

The contribution of this dissertation to the existing literature relies in its methodology. There are countless quantitative analyses on – Hungarian – electoral behaviour based on rational theory’s economic voting (Anduizia-Perea, 2005; European Social Survey, 2014, 2018; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2007). Yet, these researches are only able to explain the correlation between age and the contemporary electoral behaviour of those who have lived under communism, indicating the tendency to favour the far-right Fidesz (Enyed, Fábián and Tardos, 2014; European Social Survey, 2014, 2018). What it cannot do is the analysis that I will do here: testing whether the Western-centric models of rational economic voting fit the reasons behind the ‘X’ of Fidesz’ elderly voters in Hungary. 

 

This research aims to find that, apart from socio-economic and other qualitative factors – as the causation behind the Fidesz’ support – quantitatively, there are specific, individual reasons behind certain voters’ party preferences that cannot be measured by generalised mass-data analysis and can only be perceived by debriefing voters one by one. For the purpose of finding out whether quantitative rational economic voting models are true in the case of Hungarian Fidesz supporters, I will use the method of semi-structured interviews, whereby participants were invited through social media group advertisements to contribute voluntarily. The reason for my method to be used is what we could see from the literature review, that the socio-economic data and Western-centric research cannot demonstrate the specific individual reasons behind a vote, particularly in the case of Hungary, where the experience with democracy has been so different (Burnham et al., 2008: 166, 169-170, 208-212; Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005; Lewis-Becket and Paldam. 2000). For this dissertation research I have been able to complete five interviews, each with a citizen who have voted for Fidesz in the 2018 General Parliamentary Elections. 

I have found that this method is weak in what it is strong: although it does not allow me to conclude general assumptions – what the available quantitative data did on many occasions –  about the Hungarian population as a whole (limiting the results and their value); yet is better to capture the individual reasons behind certain votes for Fidesz, what is otherwise missed in analysing Eastern European electoral behaviour. Quantitative analysis would rely on the majority of the cases’ data and on socio-economic factors (Burnham et al., 2008: 123-124, 166, 169-170, 208-212). No other influential factors are heard in the case of a Eurocentric quantitative analysis in Hungary, which would mislead us by excluding the experience of the Soviet system (Burnham et al., 2008: 123-124; Halperin and Heath, 2012: 253-285). 

 

Analysing the information gained from the interviews, I will set them against each other. The aim of this is that apart from a single-analysis of each, it gives an even better understanding to compare different thoughts, how their reasons differ and why. The limited focus on those Fidesz voters who have been born in 1971 or earlier (who have experienced the Soviet rule with a fairly mature mind before the transition of 1989-90) is compensated by the aspiration to find the most different backgrounded interviewees. These are all essential to reveal for comprehending which, the socio-economic quantitative, the personal thought-based qualitative path, or maybe both are reliable methods on Eastern European electoral behaviour. Nevertheless, I have interrogated the interviewees on their socio-economic data for the same reason, to get confirmed or rejected on the usefulness of my method.

 

This research may involve ethical issues on inconvenience or discomfort of either the interviewer or the interviewee due to the topic or the other party’s inappropriate behaviour at the interview. Also, there will be a risk of overreporting those participants who abstain claiming they voted, when the reality might not be the same (Kostadinova, 2009). Finally, there is a risk that the translated transcription may have misheard data, or that the interviewee was not telling the truth when answering some questions. Yet, for the purpose of this analysis, I have found the advantages more promising than the relevance of these drawbacks. 

 

I have looked for interview participants in multiple Facebook groups of cities (Szolnok, Kecskemet, Budapest, and Gödöllő), which I was familiar with and could access easily. Those who were fitting into the criteria of being born in or before 1971 were required to message me directly, in order to avoid their identity being connected to the participation in the Facebook groups. The post was as follows (in Hungarian): 

‘Dear Group members! If you are fond of our country and its leaders and if you were born in or before 1971, and maybe you are someone who is enterprising, especially when it is about participating in an exciting research, please send me a private message. I am looking for participants for about an hour-long interview, which would be about political topics for my dissertation. Thank you for all your help in advance and have a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year!’

I have finalised appointments with those whose Facebook profile seemed very much Fidesz supportive (such as posting pro-Fidesz content, reposting Fidesz election material, following Fidesz-related sites and groups, etc.) to minimise the chances of interviewing irrelevant non-Fidesz voters. Yet, it has happened in two cases (out of 7 interview meetings), that (1) the interviewee decided not to participate (claiming he was thinking about something different and he has always rejected participation in such social surveys), or (2) that the information I have got became irrelevant for the purpose of this essay (as the interviewee has turned out to be a non-Fidesz voter). 

I have organised the meetings in the towns where the candidates lived and where I have lived before as well (in Budapest, Szolnok and Kecskemét). This way I have already known cafés which I could recommend for the meeting and where I knew it would be safe for both of us – for me being in sight of café staff and other people and for them, that there were separated boxes in each place I have suggested, to avoid others listening to the vulnerable content we were discussing. I also asked them all if they recognised anyone in the particular café, to avoid them being related to this interview.

I have always left information – without giving any other information out about my interview participants – about my location with my family members when I have left, in order to secure my safety. I have arrived at the interviews 10 minutes early to make sure that I was all set up on time. I have had a casual conversation with them while we were ordering and have invited my interviewees for their drinks to break the possible nervous or uncomfortable feelings and to get closer. 

At the interview, the interviewees were provided all the essential material – project information sheet, consent form – and a name card on which they had contact details of me, my supervisor and a help line in case the interview brings up sensitive memories or they feel distressed about any content of the interview afterwards, due to the nature of the questions, which were as follows:

1. In which year were you born?
2. Where did you grow up? Have you changed your location of living through your life?
3. What is your socio-economic background like? (Education, parents, job, wife and children)
4. What was your opinion at the time about the Soviet communist system?
5. What did you think about socialism as a form of economy?
6. What was your parents title, job or role under the Soviet system?
7. What was your family’s opinion about it?
8. What was your friends, classmates, etc. (who you have spent time with) opinion?
9. What do you think about democracy as a form of government?
10. What do you think about capitalism as a form of economy?
11. What was your family’s opinion about it?
12. What was your friends/colleagues’ opinion about it?
13. What is your position in society?
14. What was your family’s opinion about it?
15. What was your friends/colleagues’ opinion about it?
16. Why do you vote for Fidesz? 
17. Do your family and friends vote for Fidesz as well? Do they have similar views?
18. Would you change anything in contemporary Fidesz-led politics? If so what and how?
19. Do you vote for Fidesz because there is no better option or because you agree with them and they represent you?
20. What would you say in a few words about your comparative experience of socialism and democracy? (socialism was hard/bad, democracy is now better or vice versa, or they are the same nothing has changed in your welfare)

 

After the interviews I have analysed the information I have got both, individually and in comparison to each other to find patterns, similarities and differences. It is important to see each case individually – as I have stressed before – and to see the common points which may result the common result: voting for Fidesz. Yet, we cannot ignore the differences either, in order to get the most accurate result of qualitative causes behind the support of Fidesz.

IV. Analysis: Negative Experience of Pre-Transition Far-Left Communism Versus Economic Voting Model

 

This chapter will discuss how the interviews reflect on the economic voting model. We will see that those, who did not lose much in the communist era, nor experienced the transition negatively and prefer the post-transition democracy and capitalism – as their lives became better ever since – vote for Fidesz based on economic values. Yet, those, who had a negative experience with the (pre-)transition vote for Fidesz because it is the best they can do against that liberalism, they believe (see Table 2). The economic voting model argues that voters cast their ballots based on what they see best for the economy and their own economic needs (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Becket and Paldam. 2000). Yet, I argue that this model cannot go beyond pure economy-based interests and cannot explain the electoral behaviour of those who vote based on other values. For instance, – as we will see – the anti-left identity (as a result of negative experience with left-wing governance), whereby one wants not to vote for the right-wing because they can identify with them or they are good for the economy, but to vote against left-wing parties. Therefore, we will conclude that in post-transition countries, like Hungary, the Eurocentric economic voting model cannot fully explain electoral behaviour of the generation that has experienced the far-left rule, which is the main argument of this paper (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005; Inglehart, 2003). 

 

IV. I. Pre- and early post-transition left-wing governance

Based on the above, analysing the interviews, in Table 2 we can see a tendency that those, who have experienced the far-left Soviet regime’s rule negatively and did not become relatively wealthy in post-transition times are voting for Fidesz as it is the ‘… only party left on the right ideological axis’ (interviewee B).

Unfortunately, of my participants only one, interviewee B had a significant loss – meaning the nationalisation of his family’s agricultural property which has secured their income – and therefore, radically negative experience with the Soviet system, which – according to him – affects his far-right preference. Yet, it is crucial to note that he believed, Fidesz has assimilated and merged into itself all those parties who could stand as an alternative option on the right. 

In the case of the other interviewees (interviewee A, C, D and E), the economic voting model of the Eurocentric Western literature – introduced earlier – seems to find confirmation. Interviewee A said he was voting for Fidesz because:

‘… first, they represented the youth which I liked very much and now, there is just simply no any better option for the economy. Any other party would steal money the same way, but at least, with Fidesz the economy is rising. I agree with what they are doing.’

Interviewee C told that he votes: 

‘… for those who I see drive the country forward after the hard times of the transition, those who are willing to do everything for Hungary’s economic development and who are actually doing so, not only promising. […] The communist experience does not influence my voting because socialist parties today are very different, but maybe I am a bit against the left as a business-owner.’

Interviewee D claimed that Fidesz is:

‘… doing good for the country’s development and there is no better option anyway. They represent the best option in this anti-democratic ‘something’ we have nowadays. […] So, no, I am not influence by the fact that I have experienced the other system before.’ 

Interviewee E also argued that she does:

‘… not vote based on political beliefs but based on who can move this country forward. Maybe, there were stadiums building up for years, but now the focus is on domestic production, the development of healthcare and family-support. Of course, they could not have focus on everything at once, it is a process. […] [T]hey do good for the country, development and change cannot happen under one period, one strong party needs to remain in power to deliver the long-term plan.’

They have disappointed in the left-wing leaderships after the transition (meaning the MDF-FKGP/EKGP-KDNP Hungarian Democratic Forum-Independent Smallholders, Agrarian Workers and Civic Party/United Independent Smallholders Party-Christian Democratic People's Party 1990-1994, MSZP Hungarian Socialist Party and MSZP-SZDSZ Alliance of Free Democrats 1994-1998, 2002-2010) (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, n.d.; Körösényi, Ondré and Hajdú, 2017; Kiss and Zahorán, 2007). Yet, it is important to add that this disappointment is an embodiment of the economic hardship, which was not the result of the governance but the transition and the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (Andor, 2009; Simonovits, 2016). The shift from the state-controlled communist economy to a market and competition led capitalism brought decline in welfare as well as debts for Eastern European countries (Kattel, 2014; Staehr, 2010). Then, as we must know, voters are likely to punish governments which do not increase welfare (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994). Yet, in Hungary, this ‘punishment’ only came in 2010, since when the right-wing Fidesz party is in government. From this we may conclude that voters were hopeful for almost 20 years about democratic left-wing governance after the transition from the far-left communist rule, but after so much delusion – those mentioned before as well as Ferenc Gyurcsány’s speech in Öszöd, where he openly states that ‘… we have fucked it up. Not a little but a lot.’, taking voters’ leftover faith away – they have turned towards the right (Körösényi, Ondré and Hajdú, 2017: 13n8; Kiss and Zahorán, 2007).

 

IV. II. Economic voting model confirmed by the majority of elderly Fidesz supporters

Second, the existing literature has also discovered increase in economic voting in Hungarian electoral behaviour. This, although cannot be directly concluded from the results of the interviews, but as per at the time of the interviews, – detailed previously – four out of five interviewees had economic logic behind their vote (see interviewee A, C, D, and E in Table 2; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013).

For the purpose of this research, we can have the understanding that for those, who have not lost much – like the significant loss of hardly gained property in the case of interviewee B –, and who have gained a good, upper middle-class position in society after the transition, economic voting is a good lens for explaining electoral behaviour (see interviewee A, C and E in Table 2). This can be because those who have reached a good economic background since 1990 became protectionist over what they have gained with their hard work within the competition of capitalism (Kovács, 1994; Kiss, 2002). Therefore, they are likely to vote for the far-right Fidesz because it is the only party on the right-wing who can represent their interests, such as anti-immigration, protecting the public goods of their tax (healthcare, education, pension, etc.) and domestic economic developments (see interviewee A, C, D, and E in Table 2). Their age (those elderly who have experienced the communist times and born in or before 1971) might affect this considering how elder people are (1) more likely to lose their job and less likely to get a new one which gives the same living-conditions they had earlier, and (2) they are more likely to use public healthcare and get pensions (Rones, 1983; Hutchens, 1988; Sweet, 2007; Hagist and Kotlikoff, 2005). 

 

IV. III. Thoughts, opinions and roles within society then and now

Thirdly, turning back to the negative experience of the Soviet system, only interviewee D had an opinion about the system at the time. She said she:

‘… did not value it at the time, but nowadays, compared to this democracy it was much safer for the younger generation. They could build up their own life, they could get a property and feed their family. Today they need help from the parents. Democracy is better for the older generation who have already settled down, have their family and security as they have a house, they have a job or a career behind that pays the pension.’

The others declared that – as they were young or away from politics – they did not have an understanding of how it was, they have accepted and believed it was the ‘normal’. There was no image or idea about how else it could look like, only for interviewee C who had the chance to see East Germany with his own eyes (Romsics, 2007: 311-386; see Table 2). It can be also seen that the interviewees’ families and friends also did not really have an opinion about the governance and economy. Only interviewee A and B had some debates and discussions about politics but only with their closest friends (see Table 2).

 

Also, the role of the parents under the Soviet rule was not a meaningful factor in any case except interviewee B, whose parents did ‘resist’ to ‘play the game’ of the communism – where one needed to cheat, lie, tell on their friends and family, and become loyal to the party in order to reach a higher position and living-standard (Romsics, 2007: 311-386). Although, it was also the case with interviewee E’s parents, but it is essential to note the latter’s did not lose much from the transition into communism, like interviewee B’s family did. We can diagnose this result as those participants whose parents had a loss of property and resisted to ‘go by the playbook’ – to gain higher positions and more benefits by ‘cheating and lying’ – do vote for Fidesz to vote for the right-wing governance after the far-left Soviet rule. What it means is that how the parents and therefore the family has experienced the communist era is affected by how they have adopted to it at the time. Although, not in the case in interviewee E, but there has not been a loss nor need for getting more as the family was already a lower class one before, and as we know, for the poor the socialism often brought higher living standards than they had before, which for many could be enough to not desire more (Kovács, 1994; Kiss, 2002).

 

Last but not least, opinions about the transition into democracy and capitalism (in the eyes of all interviewees, their family and friends) was welcoming and still stands as a positive event for those who have earned a better lifestyle for themselves since, but not for those who have suffered from it and whose jobs became insecure (Interviewee A’s father, interviewee D’s parents and interviewee E’s husband). Yet, the overall judgement of democracy and capitalism is likely to be positive (see Table 2).

 

IV. IV. Conclusion

To sum up, the often-called Western, Eurocentric economic voting model 30 years after the transition finds confirmation in Hungary (see Table 2; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013). Yet, it cannot fully explain the reason behind those far-right Fidesz votes, which are merely about voting against the left that has caused hard times for some in their past (interviewee B particularly in the case of this analysis). Those, who have not had a significant loss from the Soviet era and who have become wealthy after the 1989-90 transition into democracy and capitalism are following economic values, voting for Fidesz as they see them – after the failure of the left-wing governance – driving the country and its economy forward (see Table 2). Therefore, we must not ignore the empirical differences of those voters who have lived under communism, as they are similarly likely to be affected by this experience as not. Fidesz could remain in power for so long not only because it is the only ‘offer’ on the right axis for those who have suffered or disappointed in left-wing led times but also, because it has accidentally come into power after the 2007-08 financial crisis, and was able to show up some numbers of growth, confirming  all theories about that the suffering of the transition and the financial crisis was the fault of the left-wing governance (see Table 2; Andor, 2009; Simonovits, 2016).

V. Analysis: Good Position in Post-Transition Society Versus Economic Voting Model

In addition to the negative experience with the far-left Soviet system, gaining a better position in post-transition society also knowingly leads to favouring capitalism and increasing protectionism and conservativism as the older, the wealthier citizens are (Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Han, 2016; Kovács, 1994; Kiss, 2002). Interviewed Fidesz voters have also confirmed this tendency (see Table 2). This chapter will discuss that not only the negative experience with the communist regime can affect the Western-standard economic voting model of electoral behaviour, but also, the positive experience in the post-transition era (meaning a not declining but increasing career, welfare, freedom, etc.). Those who did not experience harsh harm of their rights and property during the Soviet rule can still have a more positive experience in comparison afterwards. Pre-transition negative experience and the post-transition positive experience do not exclude the other, they are not contradictory. We will conclude that in the case of those who did not lose much property and wealth during the Soviet period but gained those and developed a career after the transition tend to confirm the economic voting model. Yet, it is not true for the society as whole, as the previous chapter proved, but for those who have a past with a different system in comparison. This will also support the argument of this dissertation that the economic voting model cannot fully explain the electoral behaviour in Eastern European post-transition societies from another perspective, based on early post-transition experience and the psychology of dichotomy, how one thing becomes ‘good’ for voters against another (Mandler and Mandler, 1974; Elbow 1993). Therefore, economic voting is not a given sample that can be taken for granted, there is a path that leads to these values when it comes to voting.

 

V. I. Socio-economic changes before and after the transition

First, it is important to mention that the socio-economic background was very similar in the case of all interviewees (first generation to complete secondary- and higher education), and only interviewee A has relocated to the capital from the countryside. Therefore, this paper cannot make conclusions how coming from a low background may affect voting for Fidesz apart from that it is a trend between Fidesz voters. On the other hand, it is also worth noting that all interviewed Fidesz voters favour democracy and capitalism, therefore the current system. Yet, again it must be linked to that their preference means the post-financial crisis and transition-hardship state of economy, which is now mostly linked to Fidesz (Körösényi, Ondré and Hajdú, 2017; Kiss and Zahorán, 2007; Marušiak, 2019: 237-243, 249-253; Andor, 2009; Simonovits, 2016). Therefore, voting in favour of a rising economy within which most of the interviewees could build up a well-paid career almost equal to voting for Fidesz with no other option to keep this up.

 

Second, a more significant pattern for the purpose of this study on the other hand, is that those, who have become wealthier in post-transition times than they were before, in the communist era, tend to vote for Fidesz based on economic concerns. We can see this in the case of interviewee A, C, D and E. In this case, interviewee B cannot be included as his preferences are not purely based on agreeing with Fidesz’ direction in terms of the economy (rather based on an anti-left preference), nor interviewee D, whose career has declined since the transition into democracy and capitalism (see Table 2). Yet, we can see how post-transition wealth-gain leads to protectionism and therefore, right-wing preferences. Here again we must not forget how Fidesz has been lucky with the economic results after the financial crisis, discussed previously (Andor, 2009; Simonovits, 2016; Kattel, 2014; Staehr, 2010; Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Körösényi, Ondré and Hajdú, 2017; Kiss and Zahorán, 2007). Not to mention that age – as a socio-economic factor – tends to enhance right-wing preferences, and those who have lived under the communist regime and developed a career after the transition are now in their 50’s or above (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Falter and Schumann, 1988). Yet, I claim this as a key influential factor on the target-group of this dissertation, as – we saw that – 4 out of the 5 participants supported Fidesz based on their concerns that the economy under their rule favours them and their welfare (see Table 2).

 

V. II. Psychology of dichotomy: the ‘good’ compared to the ‘bad’ experience

Third, we must involve voter-psychology to the extent that we understand how one experience (with the communist era in this case) becomes ‘negative’ or ‘bad’ in comparison to another (the Fidesz era in my study) that is ‘positive’ and ‘good’. This is the psychology of dichotomy thinking and judgement (Mandler and Mandler, 1974; Elbow 1993). It is closely linked to this research and its subjective interview-based methodology as the psychology behind the labels on parties and governments are also the subjective creations of voters’ minds. 

Similarly, – as interviewee D mentioned – gaining a better lifestyle is not only the result of the transition from the single-market Soviet products – where there was no option to choose from (only one brand of each product) and where people needed to wait for years to get a car, etc. – to the current global market where money can reach anything and therefore, the higher the salary the ‘better’ their life is in peoples’ minds (Romsics, 2007: 311-386; see Table 2). In addition, it was also about occupation and age. Some fields paid more, and some did less (formerly, it was fairly equal to all, without unemployment). Younger people have always been more likely to get a job than the elderly, which we can also see from that interviewee D was significantly older than the others when she experienced a decline in her post-transition career (see Table 2; Hutchens, 1988; Rones, 1983; Sweet, 2007). Not to mention the fact that in the Soviet era of zero unemployment, people could work or do nothing for the same salary and therefore, not everyone was used to actually working hard for their welfare at the time of the transition, which in this globalised capitalist era is a must for thriving (Romsics, 2007: 311-386). Yet, why is this current era ‘better’ for their eyes than the communist one before? It is because they have something to compare to another. They have the limited, closed-border, minimal welfare compared to the open life, full of opportunities where they have the money to get what they want. Before, they did not have more compared to others but now they do (see interviewee A, C and E in Table 2). In this post-transition, post-financial crisis Fidesz-era they live better because they have that ‘more’ money which secures that ‘better’ life they did not have before. Not because they could not afford but – as interviewee D said – because ‘… the system did not allow it.’ Yet, in their minds it remains the achievement of Fidesz and their taking over of governance.

 

V. III. Conclusion

To summarise, we can see that gaining a better (in comparison to pre-transition) economic welfare after the transition drives economic voting and in particular, towards the protectionist, conservative and nationalist far-right Fidesz (see Table 2). Yet, we must not forget how age is also a powerful factor behind all the interviewees, as it knowingly increases the likeliness of these values and right-wing preferences (Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006; Han, 2016; Kovács, 1994; Kiss, 2002). Also, the psychology behind the ‘bad’ communism and the ‘good’ Fidesz regime must be noted, as the post-transition increase in welfare is not only the result of the shift but also the ability to compare it to something else, combined with hard-working and the feeling of being able to choose  between different brands between vacations abroad, etc. which all gives the freedom that formed the label of ‘better’ than the era before, but only for those who have lived in those times. This though not only means the transition but the financial crisis as well, which makes the start of the Fidesz regime a milestone in getting a ‘better’ life (Mandler and Mandler, 1974; Elbow 1993). In this chapter again, the Western economic voting model finds confirmation in Hungary (see interviewee A, C, D and E Table 2; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013). Yet, once again we must not forget that it cannot fully explain the reason behind those far-right Fidesz votes, who votes against the left which has gave them hard times (interviewee B). In this chapter it is not merely the personal, individual experience-based opinion – of ‘bad’ past and ‘better’ present life and welfare – that reminds us on this note, but also the individual perception of comparative thinking (‘good’ and ‘bad’) that has an impact on electoral behaviour, the opinion on democracy and right versus left governance. Still, it is the result of the personal experience of those who have this juxtaposition, which confirms the usefulness of my methodology. None of these results could have come across in quantitative data analysis, nor other qualitative methods like discourse analysis, for example.

VI. Discussion: Experience of Communism or Economic Performance?

 

The previous chapters have thought us that both, the negative experience of the far-left communism as well as the positive growth in income and welfare after the transition have an impact on voting for Fidesz among the majority supporters of the party: those elderly, who have lived with a fairly mature mind under the Soviet rule and the early post-transition (Enyed, Fábián and Tardos, 2014; European Social Survey, 2014, 2018). Yet, the latter leads to the support of the economic voting argument, but the former supports my argument that the model is incomplete. Therefore, one always needs to check in each case of post-transition – elderly – voters, which model of electoral behaviour fits that particular case to truly demonstrate electoral behaviour. Now, it is time for us to compare these two patterns we have just found in the interviews and decide whether one or both of them are equally good, better or worse in explaining post-socialist electoral behaviour than the Western economic voting model (Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013). 

 

VI. I. Contribution to electoral behaviour studies

Both, the negative experience with communism and the positive experience with post-transition increasing welfare are dependent on individual’s unique situations: whether they had much property to lose at the time of socialisation (making land public) or whether they were able to be competitive in capitalism and therefore, be able to build up a well-paid career, or not. The previous chapters have shown that this is not very significant in the case of those who did not have a negative experience with the far-left system but still prefer the current governance even without positive increase in welfare after the transition, where the model still gains confirmation on voting based on economic preferences (see interviewee A, C, D and E in Table 2). It is also safe to assume that the group which did not fall into my interview target group, who had a positive experience with the Soviet era are the left-wing – socialist – voters (Szabó, 2016). Yet, the Western economic voting model cannot explain the minor but significant group of cases where the electoral behaviour is shaped by the negative experience of both eras, leading to a politically anti-left attitude (see interviewee B in Table 2). Therefore, the economic voting model proves to be accurate in most cases but not every time:

pre-transition experience (far-left Soviet rule)	post-transition experience (left-wing democracy)	electoral behaviour model	interviewee
negative	negative	political (anti-left)	B
positive	negative	economic or political (socialists)	no example in this study, possible socialist voters (Szabó, 2016)
negative	positive	economic	A, C, E
positive	positive	economic	D

Table 1

 

In addition, to other studies it might be relevant that the economic voting model can only project the economic preferences and not what is behind: the individual experience that has led to a certain label on the economic performance they ‘prefer’ (Burnham et al., 2008: 123-124; 208-212; Halperin and Heath, 2012: 253-285). Interviewee D for instance had a different path to economic voting compared to interviewee A, C and E as she did not gain much after the transition but still supports Fidesz, but it is a topic for another analysis (see Table 2). What is crucial here is that the negative experience with the Soviet era results an anti-left, not so economic preference in electoral behaviour (interviewee B). The post-transition positive experience with democracy and sometimes in addition an increased welfare (especially post-transition and post-economic crisis) leads to protectionist right-wing preferences on economic grounds.

Therefore, my study has found a way how a post-transition voter can reach economic voting, which expands the literature on the Western model. We have seen that the negative experience of both, pre- and post-transition times is where the economic voting model does not come into the picture of explanation at all in the analysis Hungarian Fidesz voters’ behaviour. Consequently, I have filled the loophole on those post-transition voters, who cannot be understood through the economic voting model due to their past which has formed an anti-left attitude away from economics. 

 

VI. II. The need for qualitative methodology with individual-level focus

Last but not least, my methodology and its usefulness have been both, confirmed and rejected. On the one hand, we have got confirmation that none of these individual stories behind Fidesz’ support could come through any other type of analysis of electoral behaviour. Even though, 4 out of 5 interviewees confirmed that their preferences were based on their economic concerns, interviewee A who had a negative pre-transition and early (left-wing led) post-transition experience must not be alone in post-Soviet societies with becoming an anti-left voter regardless his economic views. In addition, economic voting – based on the idea that people vote in relation to their economic preference that is based on their own perception on which party’s decisions for the economy will benefit them and their welfare the most – also found support (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Becket and Paldam. 2000). Therefore, my research here is contributive to the existing literature not only in (1) uncovering the validity of the economic voting model in the case of post-transition, far-right governed Hungary but also, in (2) going after the individual reasons behind those seemingly economic votes as well as (3) those which are based on other concerns (see interviewee B in Table 2). 

 

VI. III. Conclusion

In conclusion, my study has shown that both, the negative and positive experiences of pre- and post-transition times shape electoral behaviour, but in most of the cases the result is a vote based on economic preferences (see interviewee A, C, D and E in Table 2). Yet, I have uncovered the gap of those who do not cast their ballots based on their economic concerns (see interviewee B in Table 2). Therefore, we must not forget that the case of Eastern European post-communist electoral behaviour is a complex one, where economic, socio-economic and institutional changes all play a key role (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005). We must keep in mind that these results are only valid when it is about the ‘Soviet-generation’ of Hungary’s active voters. These trends, rejections and confirmations of the economic voting model can only be applied to that particular generation, who have lived under ‘the other’ system with a fairly mature mind to compare it to the current democracy.

VII. Conclusion

 

The contribution of this dissertation to the existing literature is highlighting the limits of the Western, Eurocentric model of economic voting in explaining the electoral behaviour of post-transition countries (Ahlquist et al., 2018; Fidrmuc, 2000; Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, 2013; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013; Nannestad and Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Becket and Paldam. 2000). Analysing how the experience of the Soviet communism has an impact on contemporary electoral behaviour of the majority of Fidesz – the elderly – supporters has helped us to fill the gap in the Western-centric literature on Eastern European electoral behaviour. In the case of Hungary, electoral behaviour can be explained by the economic voting model only in the case of those who – lived in the Soviet era and – did not lose much under the communist times and who did get relatively wealthier in post-transition times. Yet, in the case of those who did lost significant amount of – hardly gained – property and who did not ‘get better’ since the transition, not economic voting but rather a dedication to vote against the disappointing left-wing leadership, whereby the only option on the right is Fidesz (see interviewee B in Table 2; Kingsley and Novak, 2019; Tóth, 2018; Balavány, 2018; 444 news, 2019; Zsíros, 2019).

Therefore, the strong support of the elderly for Fidesz can be explained by both, the economic voting model and the individual negative experience of left-wing (Soviet communist) regime. Although, the economic voting model covers those who had a positive pre- and post-transition experience with left-wing governance (who we can assume to be socialist voters outside of this research’s target group, based on the existing literature) and those who had negative experience before- but  positive after the transition, it cannot explain one division of the cases where the electoral behaviour is shaped by the negative experience of both eras (see interviewee B in Table 2; Szabó, 2016).

 

This research has confirmed the above by first, looking and the existing literature and the differences of Easter Europe from the Western perceptions (Anderson, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2003; Fidrmuc, 2000; Tóka, 1998; Benoit, 2005; Inglehart, 2003). Also, I have discussed why a qualitative method is needed to extend the quantitative economic focus in the case of post-transition countries like Hungary (Burnham et al., 2008: 123-124; Halperin and Heath, 2012: 253-285). Through the analysing chapters I have found confirmation on economic voting in the case of 4 out of 5 interviewees who did not have a sharp negative opinion about the pre-transition order, and in 3 out of 4 cases the transition has increased their career and welfare (see Table 2). Yet, there is a gap in the Eurocentric economic voting model where both pre- and post-transition experience with far-left and left-wing leaderships are negative (see interviewee B in Table 2). Finally, I have further explained this and the benefits of my research in the discussion section, whereby my argument and methodology’s appropriateness both found confirmation on the limits of the qualitative economic theory.

 

I have focused on the particular age group of those who were at least  18 years old at the time of the transition – and therefore had a fairly mature mind to understand economics and politics – because (1) they are the primary supporters of the far-right Fidesz, who have the past far-left experience and because (2) this experience of theirs can have an impact on their vote in any other Eastern European post-transition country, which calls for an revisit on the economic voting model in the case of Easter Europe’s electoral behaviour (Enyed, Fábián and Tardos, 2014; European Social Survey, 2014, 2018).

 

The key takeaway of this study is that one must not take one explanation – the economic voting model – for granted when looking at Eastern European electoral behaviour and in particular, the elderly voters who have a communist past to compare current politics to. We have uncovered the limits of the economic voting model being unable to explain other possible logics behind. That different logic in Hungary’s elderly generation is shaped by the negative experience of the Soviet communist regime and its rule. Therefore, in the case of Eastern Europe and particularly Hungary, electoral behaviour cannot be explained by only the economic voting model without the elderly voters’ personal experience with the far-left leadership. This could only be found out by asking voters individually, those who have lived under the Soviet system, why they vote for Fidesz. Therefore, I have found that the existing methods for analysing electoral behaviour – particularly that of economic voting model – are supported but only to an extent (see Table 2; Lippényi, Maas and Jansen, 2013). In Eastern European electoral behaviour, it is necessary to extent the methodology by considering further qualitative factors – similarly to this study about the past experience with pre- and early post-transition far-left governance and financial crisis –, to prevent far-right history repeating itself (Geary, 2000; Romsics, 2007: 123-172).

VIII. Appendix A: Summary of Interviews

 

	Interviewee A	Interviewee B	Interviewee C	Interviewee D	Interviewee E
Year of birth	1965	1965	1962	1946	1956
Where did you grow up? Have you changed your location of living through your life?	grew up in Szolnok city, snow lives in the capital	grew up in a village, first generation to move to the nearest city (Kecskemét) under the communist regime	born in Szolnok (a smaller county seat), still lives there	born and grew up in Esztergom (a touristic not too populated city), now lives in Szolnok	grew up in a village, later moved to Kecskemét where she still lives
What is your socio-economic background like?	first-generation to finish gymnasium (‘A-levels) and to go to university in economics, he is divorced with 2 grown up intellectual children, currently a non-profit economist	first generation with completed secondary education, now higher educated, still lives in Kecskemét, completed higher education and is now working in ground engineering, married and the children are also now married	married with 2 children, having a small family business, finished vocational school and later college as well, the children have university degrees	parents were producer cooperatives and social insurance administrators, had one sibling and one daughter, learned to become an accountant, later became chief accountant, her husband was working in a factory (BRG) until the transition	parents had primary education only, she finished college to become an accountant, also her children and grandchildren all university-level educated
What was your opinion at the time about the Soviet communist system?	under 18 years old he did not really feel the communism, the police were a bit more strict and the teachers told ‘they need to say this’, and it was told the West is ‘bad’; He joined the compulsory military for 1 year (to be able to go to university) which  was like prison without human dignity; overall there was a predictable welfare but with atrocities and corruption everywhere	it was dictatorship with zero freedom, limited education, media and politics, but as a youngster, it was okay because youth was happiness, he could do the 1,5 military service in one after university (not like others, 1 year before, 1 after)	cannot be compared, he was a professional basketball player, could not have a proper job only in illegal ways, did not think about politics only when he saw how Germany is different at a championship, it has turned his views to negative about the Soviet system	she did not value it at the time, but now, compared to democracy it was much safer for the he younger generation, whereas democracy is better for the older generation who have already settled down, have their family and security	there was no other opinion, did not the party in any form (youth associations nor party membership), it had to be accepted, but people were ‘controlled’ by the kádár group (those loyal and dedicated party-members), she did not think much about politics anyway, she was working and studying untie she got married
What did you think about socialism as a form of economy?	as an economist: it is inoperable illusion, builds on human personality which does not exist, although pure profit interest is also wrong, but people need to have interest in working	socialism in one word is a bankruptcy, it cannot be functioning for long, it is unrealistic	it is horrible, it was all about fake-profit games and finding the illegal ways, smuggling and cheating to get ahead in life	at that age there were no living issues and threats, it was secured, those who were practiced in the profession were asked to set the prices and plans of production	people could live from low wages, they believed their welfare, there was no unemployment and homelessness
What was your parents title, job or role under the Soviet system?	mother as a nurse, father as a white-collar worker, they lived fairly well on a standard, getting ahead wangling to go ahead in their career	both parents were small kádár, did not want to get to higher positions in this system, did not want to be loyal to the system, they were working in a factory where similarly thinking people came together	they were in hospitality, the mother was a cook, the father the business runner (called Univer), they had peasant background, they were smuggling and wangling like everyone	producer cooperatives and social insurance administrators, accommodated to the system and doing what needed to be done for getting higher	mother was a cleaner, father was a simple man in a factory, they lived on a basic welfare level without joining any communist organisation, did not smuggle or wangle to get into higher positions
What was your family’s opinion about it?	the parents, particularly the father has been fond of communism and disappointed in the transition later on	the family’s land which was a result of hard working has been taken away, for the entire family it was a negative experience, grandparents who got the land were threatened	they did not really have an opinion, always accepted what is there, it was not a relationship in which they were talking about the system,	socialism is not communism, there were things we did not like, but those were very pity things, the education is maybe the only thing that was better and more acknowledged than today	her husband’s family was communist, but not her nor her close family and friends
What was your friends, classmates, etc. (who you have spent time with) opinion?	there were debates in secondary school about 1956, but usually people around accepted the situation, yet the transition was a huge positive experience	there was not really an opinion at that time which went against the system, they knew they were listened to so only a few times with the closes friends they have discussed politics	what is there is always bad, if it is socialism if it is democracy, it is bad, they were happy about the transition as long as its drawbacks did not come	they are thinking alike, there are both, positive and negative memories but of course, nothing was as developed as today, even though it was more stable and secure for the young, it was only working in theory	there was not really a discussion on politics and the socialist system
What do you think about democracy as a form of government?	it is a good idea, but in Hungary media and judiciary are not free from executive and legislature powers,	it is not perfect, but this is what needs to be developed because there is no better form of government, it is a good basis	‘I do not know any better, this would be the one that is normal and capable to function’	current politics kill friendships and families, people go against each other on politics, now not those who are actually experienced but the influential dictate; I do believe in democracy, but Hungary never had it and never will, no matter which party rules	it is better, people can choose but we will never know whether a party has come into power deservedly or not, even if there is a strict tax-policy coming with it, there is something to build from
What do you think about capitalism as a form of economy?	it is problematic but the best we can do so far, competition and option are important for the economy	it is functional, there are still atrocities and corruption which needs to be controlled, but it is good	it is not always fair as not only those who do well and work hard can get ahead but those who have political connections as well, but the competition is ideal, it pushes for development	even though today we do not know our neighbours, children and grandchildren need financial support (‘with a price of a house’) and we do not care or help our neighbours, it is better for any economy to have capitalism	same true for the economy, there are more options on the shelves in the store, there is consumer freedom, if one does not like it, it is their freedom to leave this country
What was your family’s opinion about the transition into democracy and capitalism?	the father as a true believer of communism, particularly found it corrupt, unfair and consumer focused world of those stealing form the public, it was the same politicians but representing different ‘values’	everyone was very blissful about the transition after the loss of property and oppression as well as the constraint acceptance of the situation	there is a mixed opinion about it, everyone has different party preferences but mostly all agree on capitalism and democracy	her husband’s job became insecure, he was working ‘here and there’, it was a negative experience, but as they were already into their careers for a long time, it was not as bad as if they had just wanted to start their career with no savings and property	there was not really an opinion, the parents have experienced the transition negatively, but it gives freedom for sure
What was your friends/colleagues’ opinion about it?	there are not many talks about capitalism in this context, but overall the environment finds multi-options and motivation of competition important, but monetary equality is missing from the communist times	political views are very varied now, but did not change relationships, there are a few people who can have an influence but there is no major change in political thinking of each other	they were generally happy without realising what it means, those who have been less successful since now complain that the previous was better	those who had the same opinion remained in the small circle of friends, they share both negative and positive memories of the Soviet system and they prefer the current system, it is not working, but more promising than communism	the friends were glad, those who did well later on prefer democracy, others wish for the old system, it really depends, they did not count with what it comes with, the difficult times
What is your current position in society?	an upper-middle-class intellectual economist (built career after the transition)	a lower middle-class ground engineering in a county seat (built career after the transition)	upper-middle class self-employed started and running a growing business, focusing on how to develop, sometimes gains recognition (the largest bakery of the country) but works for the family (built career after the transition)	owner of her own accountant business (decreased career after the transition, but due to her age and being closer to retirement)	an upper middle-class chief accountant with good reputation in the field
Why do you vote for Fidesz?	it is good for the economy, but it is not the reason why, I have voted for them when they were the real youth, now there is just no better option who would represent better values and not steal money the same way	because of the disappointment in the far-left system, not as a result of the loyalty to the party but to the right views, Orbán has integrated all those who could represent the right so there is no other option to vote for the right	votes for those who drive the country forward after the hard times of the transition, those who are willing to do everything for development	because they give money to the elderly, they started to build family-foundation support and healthcare support policies, even though, the far-left communism was fair, the right-wing today is doing good for the country’s development and there is no better option anyway	‘I do not vote based on political beliefs but based on who can move this country forward, maybe there were stadiums built for years, but now there is focus on domestic production, the development of healthcare and family-support’
Do your family and friends vote for Fidesz as well? Do they have similar views?	it is varied, but there is no harsh disagreement about politics, no friendship went wrong on politics	yes, the family prefers the right Fidesz, between friends it is more varied	it is very different, everyone has different views, there is no one specific trauma which defines the family	most of them do, only some friends have different party preference	no, it is very different for everyone, it depends how they live, who lives well votes for them
Do you vote for Fidesz because there is no better option or because you agree with them and they represent you?	There is no better option and I agree with what they are doing for the economy	there is no other party to represent my views, the left parties after the transition created debt, only under Fidesz we can see economic growth	the communist experience does not influence political preference as socialist parties today are very different, but a bit against the left as a business-owner	they represent the best option in this anti-democratic ‘something’ we have today; she is not really influenced by the experience of the Soviet system	no, but because they do good for the country, development and change cannot happen under one period, one strong party needs to remain in power to deliver the long-term plan
What would you say in a few words about your comparative experience of socialism and democracy?	Neither systems are perfect, but democracy and capitalism are better for an economy and its development, still it is not perfect either, and democracy in particular does not truly exist in Hungary	the Soviet system was unrealistic, ineffective and a stealer system of a few in position, it was hard and a loss, the current system is not perfect but better	we were dreaming about getting to the level of Austria with the transition, but it got worse and hardly anything happened before Fidesz, now we are slowly but developing, as a small business owner knows how many more people can afford to go on a holiday now	she is open to all logical transitions, but the transition from the Soviet system to democracy was horrible before Fidesz, they started to give to the public again, to ensure everyone’s living standards, public healthcare and family-support of the youth, it is not ideal but getting better and better	only those who do not like to work hard for their money cry for the previous system, there is still much to develop in poverty, but it is a slow process and Fidesz is doing it well, democracy and capitalism are much better, competition is a must

Table 2

Please note this table includes the shortened summary of responders’ relevant answers to the interview questions

IX. Appendix B: European Social Survey Data

Party voted for in last national election, Hungary	DK (Demokratikus Koalíció)	Együtt2014 Mozgalom	Fidesz (Fidesz Magyar Polgári Párt)	Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)	KDNP (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt)	LMP (Lehet Más A Politika)	MSZP (Magyar Szocialista Párt)	Munkáspárt (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt)	Momentum Mozgalom	Párbeszéd (Párbeszéd Magyarországért Párt)	MKKP (Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt)	Other	Total
Age of respondent, calculated
18	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
19	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
20	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	5.7	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
21	1.4	0.0	1.0	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
22	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
23	0.0	0.0	1.5	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.8	20.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
24	1.4	0.0	1.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
25	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.8	0.0	1.9	1.8	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
26	1.4	0.0	0.4	2.4	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8
27	0.0	0.0	1.0	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
28	1.4	0.0	1.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
29	1.4	0.0	1.7	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
30	0.0	0.0	0.2	1.6	4.5	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
31	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6	11.1	0.0	0.0	1.2
32	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.8	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
33	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.2	0.0	3.8	1.8	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
34	1.4	0.0	1.1	1.6	4.5	5.7	0.9	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
35	1.4	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	11.1	11.1	0.0	0.0	1.2
36	0.0	0.0	1.0	3.2	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
37	0.0	0.0	1.9	1.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
38	2.9	0.0	1.7	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
39	0.0	16.7	2.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
40	1.4	0.0	1.1	1.6	4.5	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
41	0.0	0.0	2.1	4.0	0.0	1.9	0.9	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	2.0
42	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.4	0.0	3.8	0.9	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9
43	1.4	33.3	2.5	3.2	4.5	5.7	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6
44	1.4	0.0	2.1	0.8	4.5	7.5	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
45	0.0	0.0	2.1	4.8	4.5	1.9	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4
46	1.4	0.0	1.7	2.4	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
47	2.9	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	3.8	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9
48	2.9	0.0	1.7	2.4	4.5	5.7	0.9	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
49	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	4.5	3.8	0.9	0.0	11.1	11.1	33.3	0.0	1.4
50	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.6	0.0	1.9	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6
51	0.0	0.0	2.3	3.2	4.5	1.9	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2
52	2.9	0.0	2.5	1.6	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	2.2
53	2.9	0.0	1.5	0.8	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	1.6
54	2.9	0.0	1.9	3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7
55	1.4	0.0	1.9	2.4	0.0	5.7	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.9
56	1.4	0.0	2.1	0.8	0.0	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
57	0.0	0.0	1.9	0.8	4.5	1.9	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
58	2.9	0.0	1.3	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
59	2.9	0.0	1.7	1.6	4.5	1.9	0.9	0.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8
60	5.7	0.0	2.5	1.6	0.0	5.7	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.4
61	1.4	0.0	1.0	2.4	0.0	1.9	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	1.7
62	4.3	0.0	1.3	0.8	4.5	1.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.4
63	0.0	0.0	2.1	2.4	0.0	1.9	3.6	20.0	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2
64	4.3	0.0	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	1.9
65	0.0	0.0	2.7	1.6	4.5	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
66	4.3	0.0	2.5	3.2	4.5	1.9	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6
67	0.0	16.7	2.1	0.8	4.5	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7
68	2.9	0.0	2.3	0.8	0.0	1.9	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	2.2
69	5.7	0.0	2.5	4.8	4.5	0.0	6.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
70	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.8	4.5	1.9	4.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
71	5.7	0.0	1.1	0.8	4.5	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	1.6
72	2.9	0.0	1.5	2.4	0.0	3.8	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7
73	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5
74	2.9	0.0	1.1	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
75	4.3	16.7	1.7	2.4	4.5	0.0	1.8	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.1
76	1.4	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
77	1.4	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.4	20.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
78	2.9	16.7	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	22.2	0.0	0.0	1.4
79	1.4	0.0	1.1	0.8	4.5	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
80	2.9	0.0	1.7	0.8	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5
81	1.4	0.0	1.3	1.6	0.0	1.9	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
82	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
83	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
84	1.4	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3
85	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
86	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
87	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
88	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
89	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
90	1.4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	70	6	524	124	22	53	111	5	18	9	3	1	946

Table 3

Source: European Social Survey Data, 2014 (extract)

 

Party voted for in last national election, Hungary	Fidesz - KDNP (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség Keresztényd)	Jobbik (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom)	LMP (Lehet Más A Politika)		MSZP-Együtt-DK-PM-MLP (Kormányváltók)	Munkáspárt (Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt)	Other	Total
Age of respondent, calculated
18	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
19	0.2	1.3		0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.5
20	2.2	0.0		2.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.3
21	1.2	3.1		2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3
22	0.2	2.5		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
23	1.7	1.9		2.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.4
24	0.7	1.3		4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8
25	0.7	1.3		0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7
26	1.4	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.7
27	1.7	0.0		2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9
28	0.7	1.3		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
29	1.2	1.3		2.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3
30	2.2	1.3		0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.5
31	1.0	3.1		2.1	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.4
32	2.4	3.1		4.2	0.9	0.0	0.0	2.2
33	1.0	0.6		2.1	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.9
34	0.7	1.9		2.1	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.1
35	1.2	3.8		0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.5
36	2.2	3.1		2.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.9
37	2.6	1.9		2.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.9
38	1.4	5.0		2.1	3.1	0.0	0.0	2.6
39	1.7	3.1		2.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.6
40	1.4	1.9		0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.4
41	2.9	4.4		2.1	3.1	0.0	0.0	3.2
42	2.4	3.8		8.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.7
43	1.0	1.9		2.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3
44	1.7	2.5		2.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.5
45	1.7	1.9		2.1	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.5
46	2.4	2.5		2.1	1.8	0.0	0.0	2.2
47	3.1	2.5		6.2	1.8	0.0	0.0	2.8
48	2.4	1.9		2.1	0.9	0.0	0.0	1.9
49	0.5	1.9		0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7
50	1.7	1.3		2.1	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.5
51	0.7	0.6		2.1	1.8	0.0	0.0	1.1
52	1.9	3.8		6.2	1.8	0.0	33.3	2.6
53	1.4	0.6		4.2	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.4
54	1.9	1.3		0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.5
55	1.0	2.5		0.0	1.8	16.7	33.3	1.6
56	1.0	3.1		0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.4
57	1.4	0.6		10.4	3.6	16.7	0.0	2.5
58	1.7	1.3		0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.6
59	1.9	1.9		2.1	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.5
60	1.9	1.3		0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	1.6
61	1.4	1.9		0.0	4.5	0.0	0.0	2.2
62	2.4	0.6		0.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	2.1
63	2.4	2.5		4.2	2.2	0.0	33.3	2.6
64	3.1	0.6		0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	1.8
65	1.4	2.5		0.0	4.0	0.0	0.0	2.2
66	2.4	1.3		0.0	2.2	16.7	0.0	2.1
67	2.9	0.0		0.0	4.5	16.7	0.0	2.7
68	0.7	0.0		2.1	4.5	0.0	0.0	1.6
69	1.7	0.0		2.1	3.1	0.0	0.0	1.8
70	1.4	1.3		0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3
71	1.2	0.6		0.0	3.6	16.7	0.0	1.8
72	1.7	0.0		0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.4
73	2.6	0.0		2.1	3.6	0.0	0.0	2.3
74	1.2	1.3		0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.2
75	1.0	0.0		0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.8
76	1.9	0.0		0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	1.6
77	0.7	1.3		2.1	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.3
78	1.0	0.6		0.0	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.2
79	0.5	0.0		0.0	1.3	16.7	0.0	0.7
80	0.2	0.0		0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.2
81	0.5	0.6		0.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	0.8
82	1.2	0.0		0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.7
83	0.2	0.6		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
84	0.7	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
85	0.2	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
86	0.2	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
87	0.2	0.0		0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.2
88	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
91	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	0.2
92	0.2	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1
Total	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=	416	159		48	223	6	3	855

Table 4

Source: European Social Survey Data, 2018 (extract)

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