Reinforced postcolonialism by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Global Politics of Nuclear Weapons

Can the ‘nuclear apartheid’ in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) be sustained? Why, or why not?

Abstract

This essay will look at the NPT through a postcolonial lens, analysing (1) how it reinforces the colonial order, (2) how  it ‘forces’ non-nuclear states to sign up under the label of getting protection from those who have nuclear weapons, creating a global nuclear security-dependency and (3)  why this ‘nuclear apartheid’ cannot and should not be sustained. The current global NPT world order cannot be sustained because (1) we have not yet seen a state that really wanted to possess nuclear weapons to be stopped and (2) due to the rising importance of other means of global order, most importantly economy; and should not be sustained (3) as it undermines the Westphalian state sovereignty of the many non-nuclear states and (4) is creating global threats via the discourse on ‘rogue’, ‘rebel’ states who would like to develop their own nuclear capabilities for their own security. Why are they any less legitimate in doing so? It is only the result of global NPT discourse, that favours the West and the five nuclear weapon states, the ‘Great Powers’.

The example of India will highlight the issues around the NPT status quo, not allowing those who did not possess nuclear weapons before the treaty, to develop new ones. Global security plays against itself by pointing out states that are looking for their own nuclear security as threats. It is all about (post)colonial labels, the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states.

 

Introduction

This essay will discover why the so-called ‘nuclear apartheid’ in the Treaty  on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) cannot or rather should not be sustained for much longer. The reason for this is the fact that nuclear non-proliferation reinforces the colonial status quo, which favours a very few nuclear states (the ‘nukes’: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Russia, France and China, but we can also add India, Pakistan and North Korea who do not belong to the NPT and are often called ‘lose nukes’), subordinating all the rest by making them and their security  dependent on their nuclear capabilities (Biswas, 2001, 2013; Gusterson, 1999;  Chung and Afaim, 2014).

This essay will try to fill the gap in the existing postcolonial literature on the ‘why’ this status quo should not be sustained any further, damaging the non-nuclear majority of states and their sovereignty by reinforcing their dependence on the security promised by the goodwill of the legitimate NPT nuclear weapon states (Biswas, 2013; Chung and Afaim, 2014). I will uncover how the NPT reinforces colonial order, how it defines and constantly reinforces the groups of who can and cannot possess nuclear capabilities, labelling nuclear weapon states (NWS) non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and  making the majority of the sates dependent on a handful of nuclear powers (Biswas, 2001, 2013). Then, I will argue why this status quo ‘nuclear apartheid’ should not be sustained because (1) no state that has really wanted to possess nuclear weapons has be stopped to get them and (2) due to the rising importance of other means of global order, most importantly economy (Waltz in Gavin, 2015: 43, Bruche, 2009; Nye, 1992; Ikenberry, 2008). Then this all together will allow us to analyse why this status quo – destroying the sovereignty of all non-nuclear states – should not be sustain, looking at the example of India. India is perfect for the purpose of this analysis, as it is labelled as a non-nuclear state by the NPT discourse (and global social construction), yet it is able to possess them and is questioning the importance of nuclear weapons in global governance by its rising (Cohen, 2000; Bruche, 2009).

The ultimate question of this essay is then: why the ‘nuclear apartheid’ in the NPT cannot and more importantly, should not be sustained? Answering this will lead us to the postcolonial side of global nuclear order and the NPT. Seeing it will help us to move beyond in future analysis of the NPT and its future.

Key Definitions

In this essay, it is crucial to define ‘postcolonialism’ and its connection to feminism, and the ‘nuclear apartheid’. Postcolonialism is a theory of security studies, growing from Edward Said’s well-known book: Orientalism (1978). A postcolonialist analysis argues that the ‘Great Powers’ which have historically been powerful – and also the colonizer – remain in power only via other means and colonialism is still central to word (and nuclear) order. By this we mean that colonizer empires are not directly present by military in their colonies, instead they subordinate those states via trade, security, and other ways of globalization (Spivak, 1988; Jacobs, 2013). This is done via discourse and action as well, meaning that treaties can just as much support this status quo global order as the practice of surveillance, the war against terror or arms control, where the ‘Great Powers’, most importantly the U.S., rule over the ‘weak’ states (Chung and Afaim, 2014). This is an exclusionary, Western-centric or Eurocentric world order we are living in today, where feminist theory’s masculine dominance (also closely linked to postcolonial theory)  overrules non-nuclear states and enforces their dependency, circulating their status of weakness (Peoples, 2010; Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Mgbeoji, 2006; Bilgin, 2010; Gusterson, 1999).

‘Nuclear apartheid’ is closely linked to the postcolonialist concept. It is the way how non-nuclear ‘weak’, ‘underdeveloped’, ‘irresponsible’ states of the Third World – which again is a (post)colonial categorisation – are racially marginalised and continuingly excluded as the ‘other’ in international politics and security, who are not ‘allowed’ to get nuclear weapons. The ‘nuclear apartheid’ is reinforced by international treaties and alliances, keeping non-nuclear states away from getting nuclear weapons and dependent on the promise of security of those states who have them (Biswas, 2001, 2013; Gusterson, 1999; Chung and Afaim, 2014). The concept of ‘nuclear apartheid’ has come from India’s supply side non-proliferation argument. This is about how in the global South there is a real hypocrisy in the system which does not allow them to have nuclear power to generate electricity or for anything, this is restricted by those few nuclear states who can do anything with their capabilities. Global nuclear politics is driven by power-relations, it reinforces the colonial hierarchy and its power-relationships.

Within this postcolonial, masculine dominated context of ‘nuclear apartheid’ we can now look at how this all is needed to analyse the role of the NPT and its sustainability.

Critical Postcolonial Analysis of the NPT

First of all, how does the NPT reinforce the colonial order? The NPT, the first treaty between nuclear and non-nuclear states has come into force in 1970, which represents nuclear weapons as an issue if it is ‘theirs’ but as ordinary if ‘ours’, where ‘theirs’ stands for the non-nuclear, weak Third World states (Gusterson, 1999). Non-proliferation aspirations and the NPT officially exist to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons by restricting access to nuclear weapons, technologies and materials (Biswas, 2001, 2013; Schneider, 1994; Saunders, 2001).Yet, the NPT discourse reinforces the colonial status quo in categorizing those who can and cannot have nuclear weapons, defining ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ (Chung and Afaim, 2014). Most importantly, the NPT does not disarm those who already have the nuclear tools, only not allows anyone else to get them (Biswas, 2013). By this, it creates the group of those who can (USA, UK, France, Russia and China, but not India, Pakistan and North Korea who have not been nuclear before the NPT nor have joined it) and who cannot (the rest) possess nuclear weapons, defining the former by social construction as developed, stable and trustworthy, and the latter as instable, irresponsible and developing (Biswas, 2013; Peoples, 2010). Within this context, according to NPT discourse, the developing ‘rogue’ states not only lack the technological and political maturity to be trusted (regime leaders free from democratic constraints, led by religion or other fanatical leaders), but also it is inappropriate for them to spend on those ‘luxurious’ nuclear weapons while having much more urging domestic issues including health, poverty and hunger (Gusterson, 1999). Therefore, other than the existing nuclear powers, states are illegitimate to possess nuclear weapons, and this structure can be found across the international regime, including the United Nations Security Council and NATO (Rathbun, 2006; Chung and Afaim, 2014, Jabri, 2013). By this the NPT contributes to the status quo order of the so-called ‘Great Powers’ who have been ruling the world over centuries via different colonising means, from direct military presence to economic and security subordination (Chung and Afaim, 2014; Spivak, 1978). The dominance of NWSs is also clear when it comes to their nuclear testing: they never used their own land but the less populated (but still populated) areas of their ‘colonies’ (Jacobs, 2013). This cannot be sustained as NNWSs will always try to break out of their subordination which will be seen as a global security issue until they are labelled as NNWS; and should not be sustained in an era of state-sovereignty, where all states should have their own self-reliant security (Biswas 2001, 2013; Hayman and Williams, 2006).

Secondly, the NPT also ‘forces’ non-nuclear states to sign up, to get protection from those who already have nuclear weapons (Krause, 2007). This creates an international dependency in security, which again enmeshes other global areas such as economy and trade, law and politics. This dependency undermines the most essential sovereignty of all the 190 non-nuclear states (Stratfor, 2019). It legitimises nuclear states, who can and should – as the ones responsible for global security by their nuclear position – control others’ nuclear developments, tests and even police on them (Gusterson, 1999). Although, in another essay one could question the reliability of nuclear states and how they manage their nuclear arsenal, particularly analysing the US and its multiple mistakes which have almost led to catastrophe, here we will accept their status quo position for the purpose of this postcolonial analysis (Last Week Tonight, 2014).

Critically analysing then, to answer the main question of this study, the NPT world order destroys the sovereignty provided by the 1648 Westphalian Treaty (Hayman and Williams, 2006). In contemporary post-Cold War era, all non-nuclear states must be in alliance with nuclear states to be nuclear-protected and this world order should not be sustained (Biswas 2001, 2013; Spivak 1978). Undermining all those states keeps them not only dependent in security terms but also, holds them in their status of ‘developing’, ‘dependent’, ‘weak’, woman and child-like vulnerability (Peoples, 2010; Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Mgbeoji, 2006; Bilgin, 2010; Gusterson, 1999). This again, cannot and should not be sustained for the same reasons as discovered above.

Third, the question is why then, this ‘nuclear apartheid’ cannot and should not be sustained? There are multiple reasons for this and by now we have some idea about the NPTs  ‘role in maintaining the status quo dependency, undermining state-sovereignty and creating global security issues on those labelled as NNWS (Krause, 2007; Hayman and Williams, 2006; Biswas; 2013). Most importantly, the postcolonial point of view is that the NPT and its ‘nuclear apartheid’ subordinates, weakens and makes non-nuclear states dependent on the five nuclear ones (Biswas 2001, 2013; Spivak 1978). This although might mean international stability, the status quo favours the few over the many, which is far from democratic values which are enforced over the world, claiming non-democratic societies ‘unreliable’, ‘rebel’, etc. the same way as those who want to possess nuclear weapons (Hayman and Williams, 2006; Gusterson, 1999).

This Western centric global order cannot be sustained because (1) we have not yet seen a state that really wanted to possess nuclear weapons to be stopped and (2) due to the rising importance of other means of global order, most importantly economy (Waltz in Gavin, 2015: 43, Bruche, 2009; Ikenberry, 2008). Even though, there have been examples when states gave up their developed nuclear weapons (such as South Africa) or their diplomatic fight to get them (like the case of India), no government that really wanted to create them has been prevented to do so (the example of North Korea) (Sagan, 1996; Waltz in Gavin, 2015: 43). Even though, it may sound surreal, other means apart from security and nuclear weapons can also become so worthy that it can shape the world order. Economy and trade are two of these, in which China has been rising in the past couple of decades. China does not have a significant nuclear security structure, nor a strong alliance around it, nor it has ever tried to act like one responsible for keeping the world in balance and peace, like the US does (Yeo, 2017).  Instead, China has started to rule the world via economy, which can question the entire status quo of NPT world order, but it is a topic for another essay in the future, when it becomes clearer that nuclear weapons are not everything anymore (Ikenberry, 2008; Nye, 1992).

Last but not least, to see in practice, why the ‘nuclear apartheid’ of the NPT cannot/should not be sustained, let us look at the example of India.  India has been about to become a new nuclear power, but then it has changed its mind. Why? In short, it has been the masculine dominant pressure of the Great Power US and domestic interest to avoid a nuclear conflict with Pakistan, with whom India had historically bad relations (Das, 2014; Biswas, 2001). In more detail, we must not forget India’s relations to Pakistan. Ever since the British Empire has gave them both independences, they have been fighting over the territory of Kashmir and other disagreements (Biswas, 2001; Brookings Institution, 2013). India did not test nuclear weapons after China did so, but within 3 years after it has been in conflict with Pakistan (Sagan, 1996). They have both become nuclear without being legitimised as NWS and without being stopped, confirming the critical analysis above (Waltz in Gavin, 2015: 43).

Although, India has not been the best example in demonstrating how the NPT does not allow new nuclear powers to emerge as it did not sign up in the first place, it supports the postcolonial vision on international nuclear dependency – by the US in this case – and why this status quo should not be sustained: India being a nuclear power would stabilise the region and break out of its ‘developing’ vulnerable status (Das, 2014). If it really means that other states will follow – as Waltz presumes –, the global order will become truly fair and equal, where those marginalised and excluded regions can also be heard and be able to protect themselves without being dependent on the verbal goodwill of others (Waltz, 2012).

The US objective not allowing new nuclear states to emerge is about protecting the independence of US security and the fear of how might non-democratic possessors use these capabilities. The US reinforces its position via legal/normative, coercive and assurance strategies as well, from pursuing arms control treaties and norms to security guarantees and alliances (Gavin, 2015). It is only pushing its own technology into India and ensuring its global policing role in the region. India uses a democratic/undemocratic discourse against Pakistan, to emerge as a nuclear powers, building on the common point with the US, while there is also the conflict between the Western, orientalist US and the postcolonial India (Das, 2014). Therefore, this example tells us how the nuclear US uses India’s desire for nuclear capabilities to reassure its global dominant position via their need, yet never allowing for true ‘nuclearization’.

If states like India remain labelled as NNWSs by the five accepted NWSs – those who can keep their capabilities according to the NPT, based on simply that they already had those before the treaty came into force –, it is a social construction of the global society, seeing them as ‘bad’, ‘unreliable’, etc. (Biswas, 2001, 2013). If India and the other states with nuclear capabilities, yet with the label of NNWS would become equally accepted NWSs, they would not require those extra security attentions from the NWSs to ‘check up on them if they are behaving well’ like the institution of IAEA (IAEA, n.d.; Rathbun, 2006). Also, – particularly in the case of the much-divided India with its mixture of religions and languages – it could result domestic and regional stability. The US and Russia, both NWS, have long been federations with mixed cultures and interests. Yet, they are both stable and secured, which we may connect to their NWS status. Therefore, if others, like India, Pakistan, Israel or even North Korea could also possess their existing nuclear weapons and continue their tests but accepted by the NPT, making them labelled as NWSs, they could not only solve the dilemmas of global nuclear security but also, their own united security.

Conclusion

This essay has analysed how the NPT reinforces colonial status quo in contemporary post-Cold War era by (1) not disarming those who already possess nuclear capabilities, (2) making non-nuclear states dependent on the goodwill and protection of the five nuclear powers, and (3) by the rise of other world order shaping means like global economy (Nye, 1992).

The NPT discourse keeps all non-nuclear states in the status of ‘weak’, who needs the protection of the few nuclear powers, reinforcing their dependency (Peoples, 2010; Barkawi and Laffey, 2006; Mgbeoji, 2006; Bilgin, 2010; Gusterson, 1999). This should not be sustained to make non-nuclear states sovereign and independent, who should be equal in global governance (Hayman and Williams, 2006).

The rise of China in ruling the global economy already questions the status quo of nuclear world order (Ikenberry, 2008). Economy was seen an emerging factor that can define the new world order 18 years ago and is now becoming the new means of global hegemony, where instead of threatening others by nuclear capabilities, the danger of insecurity becomes the import foreign sales, ‘stealing’ the market from domestic sellers (Nye, 1992). Yet, this to be completely true is still ahead in the future, but we are on a good track.

To focus on what is more close and real, the example of India has confirmed these colonial, masculine subordinations of the nuclear powers, particularly enforced by the United States (Das, 2014).

I have found that the ‘nuclear apartheid’ of the NPT cannot be sustained as NNWSs will always try to break out of their subordination which will be seen as a global security issue until they are labelled as NNWSs; and should not be sustained in an era of state-sovereignty, where all states should have their own self-reliant security (Biswas 2001, 2013; Hayman and Williams, 2006). Those states, who have wanted their own nuclear capabilities have never been stopped, but have been labelled as ‘rebel’ NNWSs, not accepted by the NWSs of the NPT. Instead, they should be accepted to benefit both, the global nuclear security dilemma and their own security.

Looking forward, there is a need in postcolonial analysis of nuclear non-proliferation and the ‘nuclear apartheid’ to see beyond the role of nuclear weapons, which reinforce the colonial positions alongside other global treaties and institutions such as the United Nations, the NATO, international laws, trade and so on (Biswas, 2001, 2013; Rathbun, 2006; Chung and Afaim, 2014; Jabri, 2013).

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