Security as the creation of discourse and speech act: securitisation theory

Critical Global Security Studies

What does the concept of 'securitisation' add to our understanding of security?

Abstract
The concept of ‘securitisation’ has been used by scholars to understand how issues become security issues. It clearly widens up our view on the term ‘security’ by distancing it from the military terms to the extent that any existential threat can be securitised into a security issue by securitising actors (political leaders particularly). This process is successful when audience accepts the threat extraordinary measures are taken for protection against that issue. Yet I find that apart from the wider lens on security’s meaning, this theory of the Copenhagen School is limited in so many senses from the narrow focus on state-level and who can ‘speak security’ to the success of the exclusively linear process, that it fails to cover and explain the majority of securitisation in the World. Also, Securitisation Theory has Western-centric expectation which do not exist in non-Western societies, where free speech, society and civil society are empty words, and it has failed to develop alongside communication and still focuses on speech as the single possible tool for expression (excluding visual technologies). I find the Wester-centric limitations rather under exploration by scholars, therefore I will introduce the ‘younger’ limitation of the theory seen in regional unions, namely the European Union, focusing on the securitisation of migration. It is important to point the limitations of the theory because ‘securitisation is […] shorthand for the construction of security’ (McDonald, 2008: 580), therefore I believe we need to know the limited space where we can apply it the least problematically. I do not wish to say that securitisation does not add anything to our understanding on security, my argument is rather about how the concept of securitisation adds many points (securitisation process, securitising actors, speech-act, desecuritisation), but we can only apply them to a very limited amount of cases, where the limitations mentioned, are given. My aim here is to contribute to our understanding on the – I believe – latest failure of the theory, namely regional EU level of securitisation, as I find this the least discovered of the many.

In this essay I will argue how Securitisation Theory adds the principles of speech-act and the linear process of securitising to our understanding of security, but in practice these are limited to the states of the West (Europe and the United States) exclusively (Wilkinson, 2007). This happens for at least three interconnected reasons which I will explore here: first, the too narrow focus on speech as the only possible tool for communication (excluding other visual elements, such as photos, paintings, videos, etc.) (Williams, 2003); second, consequently they only focus on those who can speak, namely political leaders, and by this they silence and exclude women and non-state actors, who (especially nowadays) can also contest security (McDonald, 2008). Third, these two points lead to a Eurocentric, narrow, limited analysis, as they fail to explain the process of securitisation where it is not so linear, not done by politicians (but the opposition, non-state actors for example), or not done by speech (there is no free speech, or there is rather a use of physical force for instance). Because of this they often tide up, simplify, or even edit processes to make them fit their linear analytical assumption and framework. All these limitations are rooted in the fact that the world has different parts with different securitisation processes (Wilkinson, 2007).

Then, even if we accept securitisation as a theory what can only be applied to the ‘West’ we will see that even in these areas it has been underestimated by various factors. The concepts of securitisation have failed to develop alongside communication, and also, fails to explain the – I believe – ‘newest’ and least discovered regional, European Union (EU) level of securitisation. This will be the main focus, by covering the EU securitisation of migration, after looking at some non-Western cases supporting the exclusionary Western-focused limit of the theory (Bilgin, 2011; d’Appollonia and Reich, 2008; Huysmans, 2000, 2006; McDonald, 2011, 2012; Neal, 2009). I will eventually come to the conclusion how it has lost its relevance by being unable to cover at least the majority of securitisation processes, if not all, due to the many limitation in the non-Western, but especially in the Western world itself.

First of all, the Copenhagen School’s Securitisation Theory finds that security is not a thing outside language, it is constructed by the speech-act of those in power, namely political leaders. The linear process of securitisation starts by securitising, that is the speech-act itself, done by politicians, the securitising actors. Those in the position as securitising actors securitise issues by declaring something – namely a referent object, that is a thing seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival – existentially threatened (Balzacq, 2011: 31-53). By this, scholars of securitisation distance the meaning of ‘security’ from its military means, this concept of security goes beyond, as anything can be said to be a security issue. Yet this is the only point where the theory is wider on security, in all other aspects it is too narrow, as we can see focusing only on political leaders and their speech. Not to mention that their approach can only be applied through the lens of national security, excluding individual, regional or international security (Buzan, Waewer, Winde, 199). Then, to finish the process: securitisation is (only) successful for Securitisation Theory when extraordinary measures are taken for protection against the securitised threat (Wilkinson, 2007), we will see the problem with this below in the analysis of the EU level looking at the securitisation of migration. I find the simplest way to demonstrate the critically too limited focus of the theory is that we can sum it up in one single question: ‘who can do security in the name of what?’ (Buzan, Waewer, Winde, 1998: 45)

Secondly, based on this preliminary knowledge, now we are able to find the three key problems of the theory, all related to its way too narrow focus. First, let us look at the narrow focus on discourse as the single possible tool for communication on security (Williams, 2003). By this they do not make any distinction between behaviour and language, ‘saying’ is equal with ‘doing’, whereas Bigo and the Paris School for instance argues that security is rather constructed through practices (Mc Donald, 2008: 570, Floyd, 2016). Not to mention Glace’s argument that statesmen must be related to some kind of external reality outside their language in order to win audience, when securitisation succeeds in gaining support for extraordinary measures (Glace cited in Balzacq, 2011: 13). I, myself also stand on the point that since we have developed our communication and we are now able to use photography or video recording to broadcast issues, a theory on securitisation should not exclude these new means. Of course, some scholars argue, images can be ‘read’ differently by individuals as there is no text saying ‘what it means’, how we should understand, and the Copenhagen School argues threat can only be in the form of words (Hansen, 2011), but  I would critique in that no much attention is dedicated to the violating videos of the Islamic State for instance. Even if we can watch those contents muted it will remain to be a threat on us, on the Western world as we can see the brutal execution of our fellow European (or other Western) citizens –  a list of these executions can be found at https://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/ISIL_beheading_incidents and videos on https://www.youtube.com.

Second, consequent of the problem of speech-act as the only tool for expression, there is a problematic narrow focus on the elite, political leaders as only securitising actors. By this the theory does not only excludes non-state actors (who nowadays have more influence and can lobby due to globalisation), but silence women who still have less access to the ‘tables’ where politics happen, yet they also contest security (McDonald, 2008).

Last but not least then, to see the third limitation of Securitisation Theory, first let me mention the relevance of how the theory of the process of securitisation fails outside Europe and the United States, the so called ‘West’ – what we can see through the following examples: Kyrgyzstan, where free speech, the Westphalian understanding of identity and society is not given, people rather used physical force, and local level action is stronger than collective nation-level, changing the process of securitisation to non-linear (Wilkinson, 2007); Turkey, where the root of securitisation, society-focused security comes to question by military-focused security, where desecuritisation is grounded on depoliticising and the entire choice of applying desecuritisation is motivated by ‘Europeanisation’ (Bilgin, 2011); or Australia, where we can see successful securitisation process of migration in terms of the acceptance of the audience, yet without those extraordinary measures taken due to the urgency of the 2008 financial crisis (McDonald, 2012), not to mention that Australia produced resecuritisation, that is new for the theory upon securitisation and desecuritisation (McDonald, 2011). This is highly important because these demonstrates the mistakes linked to the limitedness of the theory I’ve mentioned before. We can see that not in every corner of the World these tools, what securitisation expects (free speech, access to politics, state-society centrality, etc.) are given and people must turn to other tools, such as physical force. Yet, this is a field rather under exploration, therefore I want to uncover not this ‘non-Western exclusion’ of the concept of securitisation, but the regional level failure of the theory. I will do so by analysing the – as far as I am concerned, looking at its various yet effective institution above nations – the best operating of this kind, the European Union. Within, we will discover the securitisation process and measures of the ‘meta-issue’: migration.

Immigration used to be a positive effect on European economy, increasing the working force, but it has changed from the 1970’s in the name of protecting domestic workforce, and even more drastically after the events of 9/11, to protect the member-states from the free movement of terrorism (Huysmans, 2000). I find that the concept of Copenhagen School’s securitisation fails in many aspects from the securitising actors to the final extraordinary measures. First, migration has been started to be securitised before, and therefore not a direct consequence of the ‘threat’ of 9/11, rather a logical EU integration step (Neal, 2009, Huysmans, 2006: 85-104). It is a societal security issue where not state sovereignty itself, but the society, its culture and welfare are in danger (Huysmans, 2000). This I find problematic in the sense that the concept of securitisation, based on the state-centric operational level, would expect that a state is threatened. Second, on the EU level it is not a clear linear process, rather a complexity where it is difficult to define securitising actors, to analyse security discourses, not to mention that the audience from the usual ‘public’ sphere of state-level turns into a political professional group of those who listen (Neal, 2009). Therefore, all the actors of the concept are different as it would be expected by the concept of securitisation. Third, the entire subject, ‘immigrants’ as such does not fit the theory, as ‘immigrants’ are not directly the issue, but the free floating they represent, that is connected to the free movement of terrorists, what is the actual threat itself. So, we could argue the process of securitisation of migration is not successful and can never be, unless it is called the securitisation or issue of terrorism, or immigrants become the direct threat. As for now, immigrants’ asylums are the victims of the threat of terrorism but not they themselves are the threat. Huysmans named this phenomenon as a ‘meta-issue’, that is asylum seekers are not existential threat but a floating signifier for terrorism, what is unique in the securitisation expectations (Huysmans, 2006: 63-84). Fourth, a major problem with EU level securitisation is the union itself, as it is not a sovereign state that can use extraordinary measures against what its securitises by speech (Neal, 2009). This is problematic in the aspect of successful securitisation, as the concept of securitisation would expect a success when extraordinary measures are taken against the ‘threat’ subject of the securitising speech, as we have seen before. Fifth, even further, as the EU cannot securitise as it would be required, it takes alternative routes by policy making, restricting immigration in the member states (Neal, 2009; Howorth in d’Appollonia and Reich, 2008). Yet, by doing so it makes the public questioning why those policies are necessary against asylum seekers, strengthening the European racism and xenophobia against them. Also, nations come to the conclusion that the EU integration and multiculturalism (as the tool for free movement) is a threat to national sovereignty, culture and identity, and in worst case scenario they turn against the union (Huysmans, 2000, 2006: 105-123). The EU by this also focuses more on the external borders and security instead of the integration of those arriving to the member states, which highlights the misleading focus on asylum seekers instead of those inside, to help them integrate and leave their motivations (exclusion, racism, hatred, limited access to education, healthcare, distinction in rights) for terror behind. This security-focused pack of actions then, with more security leads to more insecurity and fewer civil liberties (d’Appollonia in d’Appollonia and Reich, 2008).  Finally, in the top of this, of course as we know by now, comes the development of communication, the EU can also use images and video records to demonstrate the threat of ‘immigrating terrorism’.

In a conclusion, I still do not say that securitisation is unavailing, we have seen it adds a wider understanding of security outside military terms, it adds a certain explanation of how political leaders can securitise issues through speech-act to apply extraordinary measures against. Yet, I have demonstrated how this too narrow focus of securitising actors, audience, linear process and success does not allow the concept of securitisation to provide analysis for at least most of securitisation cases, not even the West anymore, where it has been applied most successfully due to its Western-centric expectations, we have seen. We have discovered how the theory of securitisation cannot be applied outside the states – and only state-level – of Europe and North America. The concept of securitisation has too many Eurocentric expectations on free speech and its power, excluding other tools for securitising, what is further undermined by the recent development of communication. Also, it is limited in focusing exclusively on political leaders as securitising actors, not to mention how these limitations lead to a narrow Western-focused analysis. As I found this an area under discovering by many scholars, I focused on the ‘younger’ limitation of regional securitisation, looking at the EU, particularly how it has demonstrated a successful securitisation of migration but with various distinct points from the original Securitisation Theory. We have seen this in terms of securitising actors, the level of audience, successfulness without legitimacy for extraordinary measures, and a misleading securitisation of asylum seekers where the root security threat is seen in terrorism, what even lead to securitising EU integration itself on the nation level. This theory is bleeding from too many wounds, yet I believe it can be applied in a very limited circle of securitisations where all these limitations are given in the particular case.

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